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JURISDICTION
This Court has jurisdiction over this matter pursuant to Utah Code Annotated
§78A-5-103(2)(j).
STATEMENT OF CASE
This case involves a Complaint filed by the Osmond Lane Homeowner
Association (the "Association") against George Landrith ("Landrith") to recover
$32,878.02 for two interlocking brick retaining walls constructed by the Association on
Landrith's property (the "Property") without Landrith's knowledge or consent. The
Association claimed that it had authority to fix some erosion in Landrith's backyard and
then require Landrith to reimburse the Association pursuant to a Declaration of Protective
Covenants (the "Declaration") that was recorded in 1977 against all property within the
Osmond Estates Subdivision (the "Subdivision"), which included the Property.
The Declaration authorized the "George Osmond Estates Council" to take certain
actions with respect to the Property, but made no mention of the Association. Shortly
after the Complaint was filed, Landrith filed a Motion for Summary Judgment to dismiss
the case on the grounds that the Association was not the entity authorized to act under the
Declarations. The trial court denied that motion and subsequently granted a Motion for
Summary Judgment filed by the Association, finding that Landrith had "ratified" the
Association's authority to act as the "George Osmond Estates Council" under the
Declaration.
During a two-day Jury trial, the trial court excluded Landrith's expert witness from

testifying that the Association could have resolved the erosion problem by installing a
rock retaining wall (rather than two interlocking brick retaining walls) for approximately
$7,252.00. After both parties had rested, the trial court granted a motion for directed
verdict by the Association to dismiss Landrith's defenses that the Association had failed
to mitigate its damages, had materially breached the Declaration by failing to comply with
certain provisions of the Declaration, had waived its right to recover from Landrith and
had breached its implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing. The trial court found
that homeowners associations are not held to the same standard of compliance with the
terms of a recorded declaration as a "normal corporation."
The Jury thereafter returned a verdict awarding the Association $33,143.62. The
Association requested an award of attorney's fees, costs and pre-judgment interest. The
trial court overruled Landrith's objection to those awards as requested by the Association.
Thereafter, Landrith filed a Notice of Appeal.
STATEMENT OF ISSUES AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW
1.

Did the trial court error in denying Landrith's Motion for Summary

Judgment as to the Association's authority to act as the "George Osmond Estates
Council" under the Declaration? Standard of Review: Correctness. .See infra, pp.34-35.
2.

Did the trial court error in granting the Association's Motion for Summary

Judgment as to the Association's authority to act as the "George Osmond Estates
Council" under the Declaration? Standard of Review: Correctness. Pugh v. Draper City,
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2005 UT 12, If 7, 114 P.3d 546 (Utah 2005).
3.

Did the trial court error in granting the Association's objection at trial as to

Riley Bratt testifying as an expert witness? Standard of Review: Abuse of Discretion.
State v. Martin. 44 P.3d 805, 811 (Utah 2002).
4.

Did the trial court error in granting the Association's motion for directed

verdict at trial as to Landrith's defense that the Association had failed to mitigate its
damages? Standard of Review: Correctness. Management Comm. v. Graystone Pines,
Inc. 652 P.2d 896, 898 (Utah 1982).
5.

Did the trial court error in granting the Association's motion for directed

verdict at trial as to Landrith's defense that the Association had materially breached the
Declaration? Standard of Review: Correctness. Management Comm. v. Graystone Pines,
Inc. 652 P.2d 896, 898 (Utah 1982).
6.

Did the trial court error in granting the Association's motion for directed

verdict at trial as to Landrith's defense that the Association had waived its right to recover
from Landrith? Standard of Review: Correctness. Management Comm. v. Graystone
Pines, Inc. 652 P.2d 896, 898 (Utah 1982).
7.

Did the trial court error in granting the Association's motion for directed

verdict at trial as to Landrith's defense that the Association had breach its implied
covenant of good faith and fair dealing? Standard of Review: Correctness. Management
Comm. v. Graystone Pines, Inc. 652 P.2d 896, 898 (Utah 1982).
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8.

Did the trial court error in awarding the Association all attorney's fees

requested? Standard of Review: Abuse of Discretion. Dixie State Bank v. Bracken, 764
P.2d 985,991 (Utah 1988).
9.

Did the trial court error in awarding the Association all pre-judgment

interest requested? Standard of Review: Correctness. Consolidation Coal Co. v. Utah
Div. of State Lands and Forestry, 886 P.2d 514, 526 (Utah 1994).
10.

Did the trial court error in awarding the Association all costs requested?

Standard of Review: Abuse of Discretion. Beaver v. Qwest Inc., 2001 UT 81,31 P.3d
1147 (Utah 2001).
11.

If Landrith prevails on appeal, is Landrith entitled to attorney's fees

incurred on appeal?
ISSUES PRESERVED IN TRIAL COURT
Issues 1 and 2, The issue of the trial court denying Landrith's Motion for
Summary Judgment and granting the Association's Motion for Summary Judgment as to
the Association's authority under the Declaration was preserved in the trial court since
Landrith filed his Motion for Summary Judgment and opposed the Association's Motion
for Summary Judgment. R. 53-69, 500-545.
Issue 3. The issue of whether the trial court's errored in excluding Riley Bratt as
an expert witness was preserved since Landrith opposed the Association's objection to
Riley Bratt testifying as an expert witness. R. 1548, pp. 289-304.
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Issues 4-7. The issue of whether the trial court errored in granting the
Association's motion for directed verdict as to Landrith's four affirmative defenses was
preserved since Landrith opposed that motion at trial. R. 1548, pp. 375-389.
Issues 8-10. The issue of whether the trial court errored in its award of interest,
attorney's fees and costs was preserved since Landrith opposed those requests. R. 15281532
STATEMENT OF FACTS
1.

In 1977, a Declaration of Protective Covenants (the "Declaration") was

recorded against all lots in the George Osmond Estates Subdivision, Utah County, Utah
(the "Subdivision.") See Plaintiffs Exhibit No. 1. A copy of the Declaration is attached
hereto as Addendum A.
2.

The Declaration contemplated the organization of a non-profit corporation

titled the "George Osmond Estates Council" at a future date:
"Council" means the George Osmond Estates Council, a Utah
non-stock, non-profit membership corporation to be organized
to provide certain facilities and services to the community and
its inhabitants and visitors.
Declaration, Section 1.1(c). (Emphasis added.)
3.

The Declaration granted the "George Osmond Estates Council" authority to

act pursuant to the terms and conditions of the Declaration. Declaration, Sections 3-7.
4.

The "George Osmond Estate Council" was never organized. R. 320-21.

5.

In 1979, an "unincorporated association" identifying itself as the "Osmond
5

Lane Homeowners Association" (the "Association") began acting as a homeowner's
association in the Subdivision, to wit: addressing common concerns, collecting
homeowners dues and paying common expenses.1 R. 147.
6.

The Association did not operate the way the George Osmond Estates

Council was described as operating under the Declaration, for example: (a) The "George
Osmond Estates Council" was to be organized as a non-profit corporation. Declaration,
Section 1.1(c). The Association was an unincorporated association. R. 30. (b)The
"George Osmond Estates Council" was to be governed by a "Board of Managers."
Declaration, Section 1.1 (J). The Association was governed by president, vice-president
and secretary. See, e.g., R. 301. (c) The Declaration provided that homeowners were to
have "voting rights" as "specified in the Articles of Incorporation" for the George
Osmond Estates Council. Declaration, Section 4.3. The Association has no "Articles of
Incorporation" and has created no document granting the homeowners any "voting
rights." (d) The George Osmond Estates Council was to make "annual assessments,"
one-half of which would be due on January 1 and July 1 of each year. Declaration,
Section 6.6. The Association makes annual assessments that are due in full on January
10 of each year, (e) The George Osmond Estate Council was to provide copies of its

*In particular, the roads within the Subdivision are private roads and therefore must
be maintained at homeowner expense, which includes snow removal in the winter and
general maintenance. See, e.g., R. 147-318. The Association also undertook to purchase,
install and maintain a private "gate" to control access to the Subdivision. KL
6

articles of incorporation and the by-laws to all new purchasers of property within the
Subdivision. Declaration, Section 4.2. The Association does not provide copies of any
articles of incorporation or any other organizational documents to new purchasers. R.
528-529. (f) The Association collects unpaid homeowners association fees by filing
mechanic's liens. See Minutes of Osmond Lane Homeowners Association dated May 7,
1980, R. 148. ("[E]ach lot owner pay $100.00 for maintaining the center divider. This
check is to be paid in 30 days or an extra $25.00 late charge for the next 30 day period
and then a mechanic's lien will be placed on the property.") (Emphasis added.) See also
May 12, 1980 minutes R. 149. ("If not received [with the next 30 days], a mechanics lien
will be placed on the property.) (Emphasis added.) The George Osmond Estates Council
is described as collecting unpaid homeowners association fees through a "continuing
lien" procedure described under Section 6.8 of the Declaration. Declaration, Section 6.8.
7.

In 1992, George Landrith ("Landrith") purchased the property located at

892 Osmond Lane, Provo, Utah (the "Property"), which is located within the Subdivision.
R. 1547, pg. 31.
8.

Between the time Landrith purchased the Property in 1992 and the time

Landrith sold the Property in 2007, Landrith paid annual dues to the Association as his
share of the common expenses incurred by the Association for the benefit of homeowners
within the Subdivision. R. 1547, pg. 31.
9.

Landrith recognized the Association as an association of homeowners
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within the Subdivision that was organized for the purpose of addressing common
concerns, collecting homeowner dues, and paying common expenses, but nothing more.
R. 529, m 7-8.
10.

In particular, Landrith never recognized, consented to, acknowledged or

ratified the Association as having authority to act as the George Osmond Estates Council
under the Declaration. Id.
11.

Sometime between 1992 and 1994, Landrith forgot to turn off the water to

the sprinkling system for the Property, resulting in freezing, cracking of some of the
irrigation pipes, and subsequent flooding in his backyard. R. 1547, pp. 52-53.
12.

The backyard of the Property runs along the top of a steep and deep raven.

See Defendant's Exhibit 42, attached hereto as Addendum B, which is a picture of the
raven which runs behind the backyard of the Property.
13.

When the flooding occurred in the backyard of the Property, the water

drained from the backyard into the raven and caused some erosion at the top of the raven
in the southeast corner of the Property (this erosion is sometimes referred to as the
"hole.")
14.

In July 1998, the Association requested that certain repairs be made to the

Property, and provided Landrith with an "Invoice" listing the cost of making each repair.2

2

The "Invoice" showed an "amount due" for different items. This "Invoice" did
not reflect work actually done, but was only the Association's estimate of the cost of
making the repairs requested.
8

See Defendant's Exhibit 37.
15.

Landrith made some of the repairs requested, but at a much lower cost than

the cost listed by the Association in the "Invoice" and, in some cases, using an alternative
and less expensive means of fixing the problem.3
16.

At that time, the Association also requested that Landrith repair the erosion

at top of the raven in the southeast corner of the Property by "filling the hole with dirt,"
listing a cost of $2,600.00. Id
17.

Landrith believed that the erosion was simply part of the terrain and did not

require repair and therefore Landrith did not repair the erosion at the top of the southeast
corner of the Property. R. 1548, pp. 340-41, 343-44. ("They talked about the steep
terrain. That's the terrain. That's the nature of the terrain... When you look at the terrain,
the hole is just one more messy part of the terrain. The whole terrain is a mess. So what
was the hole? Just another part of the mess.")
18.

In 2001, the Association requested that Landrith rebrick the brick wall in

front of the Property. R. 1548, pg. 347.

3

For example, the Association demanded that Landrith repair his sprinklers, listing
a cost of $2,650.00. R. 1547, pg. 308; R. 1548, R. 342. Landrith repaired the sprinklers
for $400.00. Id The Association demanded that Landrith replace some "dead grass,"
listing a cost of $2,900. R. 1547, pp. 309-10; R. 1548, R. 342. Landrith had four
landscapers come and look at the "dead grass." Id at 310. Based on those meetings,
Landrith determined that the grass was not dead and did not replace the grass. Id "[T]he
grass grew back." Id. The Association demanded that Landrith "stucco [his] entire
home," listing a cost of $9,016.00. R. 1547, pg. 310; R. 1548, R. 342. Rather than
"stucco" his house, Landrith had his house painted for $1,500. Id
9

19.

Landrith repaired the brick wall to the satisfaction of the Association, using

an alternative and less expensive means of repairing the brick wall.4
20.

The Association had incurred $604.00 attorney's fees in demanding that

Landrith re-brick the wall in front of the Property. R. 521-22.
21.

After Landrith had repaired the brick wall, the Association demanded that

Landrith reimburse the Association for the $604.00 in costs and attorneys fees incurred by
the Association in requesting that Landrith repair the brick wall. Id,
22.

Landrith refused to reimburse the $604.00. IcL

23.

On January 9, 2002, the Association filed a Notice of Lien against the

Property for the $604.00 in "costs and attorneys fees" stating that the Association
intended to "claim and hold a lien" against the Property "pursuant to the Declaration." Id.
24.

On May 28, 2002, the Association filed an action to foreclose on that

Notice of Lien pursuant to the Declaration in Osmond Lane Homeowners Association vs.
George Landrith et aL Civil No. 020402193, Fourth District Court, Utah County, Provo
Division (the "2002 Action.") R. 540-541.
25.

Based on a review of all minutes of the Association from 1979 through

2002, the recording of the 2002 Notice of Lien and the commencement of the 2002
Action was the first time the Association had taken action against any homeowner

4

The Association gave Landrith three bids to the brick wall re-brick, the lowest of
which was $8,900.00. R. 1548, pg. 347. Rather than re-brick the front wall, Landrith
stuccoed the brick wall at a cost of $800.00. R. 1548, pg. 348.
10

claiming authority to act under the Declaration. R. 147-317 (where the Association has
attached all minutes and financial records for the Association from 1979 through 2004.)
26.

In his affidavit, Nevan Anderson, the president of the Association, did not

identify any action taken by the Association against any homeowner, other than Landrith,
in which the Association claimed authority to act as the George Osmond Estates Council
under the Declaration. See Affidavit of Nevan Anderson, President of the Association.
R. 320-322.
27.

On June 17, 2002, the Association obtained an Ex Parte Order authorizing

service by publication on Landrith. R. 358.
28.

By July 30, 2002, Landrith had not received actual notice of the 2002

Action and the Association obtained a Default Judgment against Landrith. Id R. 358.
29.

On August 15, 2002, the Court issued a Writ of Execution ordering the sale

of the Property to satisfy the $604.00 in costs and attorney's fees owed under the Default
Judgment. Id R. 358.
30.

By September 5, 2002, Landrith had become aware of the 2002 Action, and

on that date filed a pro se written objection to the Writ of Execution. R. 358, 540.
31.

On September 20, 2002, a hearing was held on Landrith's objection to the

Writ of Execution and Landrith appeared pro se and objected to the Association's
authority to file the 2002 Notice of Lien or to file the 2002 Action against him:
There was no meeting, there's no record of any meeting being
held with other members of the association whereby [the
11

Association President] discussed this and got approval [to file
the 2002 Notice of Lien or 2002 Action.]
R. 375 (Transcript of September 20, 2002 hearing, pg. 2.)
32.

The Court refused to consider Landrith's objection on the merits because a

Default Judgment had already been entered. R. 371-75; pp. 2, 8, 11. ("You know, you're
raising this a little late...[Y]ou're too late. You had 30 days to appeal it or move to set it
aside...")
33.

Landrith paid the $604.00 to avoid foreclosure of the Property. R. 540.

34.

During the summer of 2002, without Landrith's knowledge or consent, the

Association provided $1,113.50 in "lawn and yard maintenance" to the Property. R. 539540.
35.

The Association demanded that Landrith reimburse the Association for

$1,113.50. R. 539-540.
36.

Landrith refused to reimburse the $1,113.50. R. 539-540.

37.

On November 14, 2002, the Association filed a Notice of Lien on the

Property for $1,113.50. R. 539-540.
38.

On December 3, 2002, Landrith paid $1,113.50 to the Association under

protest - stating in an accompanying letter to the Association that "my payment of this
invoice is NOT any agreement on my part of the legitimacy of the enclosed invoice." R.
539-540; 516. See December 3, 2002 letter from Landrith to the Association, attached
hereto as Addendum C. R. 516.
12

39.

In 2003, Landrith moved out of the Property and relocated to Bountiful,

Utah. R. 1547.
40.

Landrith began trying to sell the Property and notified Nevan Anderson

("Anderson"), then the president of the Association, that he was trying to sell the
Property. R. 1547, pg. 51; R. 1548, pp. 314-15; R. 1548, pp. 315.
41.

In the spring of 2004, without Landrith's consent, the Association made

$5,103.00 in repairs to the Property. R. 1548, pg. 317.
42.

Upon receiving a bill for $5,103.00 from the Association, Landrith was

"appalled" and "upset" by the Association's actions. R. 1548, pg. 317.
43.

On May 15, 2004, Anderson recorded notes in his journal memorializing a

telephone conversation between Anderson and Landrith in which Anderson and Landrith
agreed that Landrith would pay the $5,103.00, but only on the condition that the
Association would make no more repairs to the Property without "prior notice and
discussion with [Landrith]:"
Landrith called about the [$5,103.00] bill for work on the
house. Very unhappy. We agreed that...he will pay the bill,
although he thinks it is to high. I will send him a letter stating
that repairs in the future will only be done with my approval
and prior notice and discussion with [Landrith.]
R. 1548, pg. 316, Defendant's Exhibit 29. (Emphasis added.)
44.

Landrith thereafter paid the $5,103.00 "bill," but only on the condition set

forth above and "with strong objection" to the Association's actions in making $5,103.00
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in repairs to the Property without Landrith's consent. R. 1548, pp. 322-323.
45.

In early July 2004, Landrith and Anderson had a meeting at the Property in

which Anderson told Landrith that the "hole" in the backyard needed to be fixed. R.
1548, pp. 324, 345.
46.

At that meeting, Anderson told Landrith that to fix "the hole would cost

$100,000, and therefore suggested that in order to avoid the $100,000 cost that [Landrith]
sell him [Anderson] the house for $200,000." R. 1548, pp. 324, 345.
47.

If Landrith sold Anderson the Property for $200,000, Landrith would then

be "free of the Association and wouldn't have to worry about the hole anymore." R.
1548, pp. 324,345.
48.

Landrith rejected Anderson's offer to purchase the Property for $200,000.

49.

On July 23, 2004, Landrith and Anderson again met at the Property, and this

14

time Landrith brought "a man...to put dirt in the hole." R. 1548, pg. 345; 1547, pp. 12728.
50.

At that meeting, Anderson "reiterated" that it was going to cost $100,000 to

fix the "hole" and told Landrith that "filling [the hole] with dirt was no longer
acceptable." R. 1548, pp. 346.
51.

Three days later - on July 26, 2004 - Landrith listed the Property for sale
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with a real estate agent "as is" for $475,000.5 R. 1548, pg. 325; R. 1548, pg. 346.
52.

In November 2004, the Association retained Steve Smith, an engineer, to

begin engineering work to repair the "hole" on the Property. R. 1548, pp. 165-167.
53.

Between November, 2004, and August 2005, the Association constructed

two retaining walls in the southeast corner of the Property - at a cost of $32,878.92. R.
1548, pp. 163-264.
54.

This construction was done without Landrith's knowledge or consent. R.

1548, pg. 328-329. (I "never had any idea the work was going on because I was
absolutely stunned when I saw...that the work had been done.")
55.

Anderson testified at trial that he ordered the construction done because he

was concerned about the "safety" of "children" that live in the neighborhood. R. 1547,
pg. 73.
56.

The erosion was at the top of the raven in the southeast corner of Landrith's

backyard and could not be seen from the street. R. 1548, pp. 340-41, 343-44.
57.

There was no testimony at trial that anyone had ever seen children on the

5

In listing the Property "as is," Landrith anticipated that the buyer would resolve
the issue of the "hole" with the Association. R. 1548, pp. 330-31. Landrith prepared a
letter to be given to prospective purchasers stating that the "Association had a problem
with the hole, so they would be fully aware of it." R. 1458, pp. 330-331. On January 10,
2007, Landrith sold the Property for $445,000. R. 528. Because of the Notice of Lien
filed against the Property, the title company closing the sale of the Property escrowed
$120,000 of the sales proceeds in the event the Association's lien foreclosure action was
successful.
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Property. R. 1547, pp. 73-74; R. 1547, pp. 64-157; R. 1548, pp. 163-368.
58.

There was no testimony at trial that anyone had ever seen children near the

Property. Id.
59.

There was no testimony at trial that Provo City or any other governmental

agency had ever found the "hole" to violate any health or safety code (or any other code.)
IdL
60.

The construction of the two walls involved extensive work on the Property,

including construction of a ramp along the west side of the Property and behind the
Property to allow construction equipment to access the southeast comer of the Property:
We had a skid loader. We had to run a skid loader along the
home and dump it into the hole there on that - - on the east
side, and then he would back up, and we created a ramp on
the west side of the home and had to climb that ramp, and we
had the delivery truck that delivered the dirt there on the
driveway so it was off of the lane and not too much problem
for everybody else..
R. 1548, pg. 242.
61.

The two retaining walls were constructed using keystone interlocking

bricks. R. 1548, pp. 168,253-54.
62.

After the work was completed, the Association sent Landrith a letter

demanding reimbursement of $32,878.92 for construction of the two retaining walls. R.
1548, pg. 329.
63.

Landrith refused to pay the $32,878.92.
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64.

On August 2U5 2005, a letter was sent lo all I pi < >pu h < >\\ ners, except

Landrith, assessing them $1,450.00 to pay for the work done on the Property. R. 1548,
pg. 328.
65.

On January 13, 2006, the Association recorded a Notice of Lien against the

Property for $32,878.92 in expenses itu titled in icpairing the erosion, 11 aiming an intent
to "hold and claim a lien pursuant to the Declaration." R. 23-24; Plaintiffs Exhibit 24.
66.

On February 10, 2006, the Association filed the Complaint in this case,

seeking to foreclose on the Property for $32,878.92, and claiming authority to foreclose
on the Notice of Line pursuant to the Declaration. R. 1-30.
67.

Under the Declaration, the George Osmond Estates Council had to first give

"reasonable notice" to Landrith before entering the Property to perform any maintenance:
For purposes of solely performing the maintenance required
in this article. The Council through its duty authorized agents
or employees shall have the right, after reasonable notice to
the owner, to enter upon any parcel.
Section 6.13. (Emphasis added.)
68.

The Association did not give Landrith any notice that it was entering the

Property prior to construction of the two retaining walls. R. 1548, pg. 349.
69.

Under the Declaration, the Board of Managers of the George Osmond

Estates Council "may levy a special assessment" for the "cost of any construction or
reconstruction," but only if "such assessment shall have the assert of two-thirds (2/3) of
the homeowners and that notice of such a meeting shall be sent to all members at least
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thirty (30) days in advance of the meeting:"
In addition to the annual assessments authorized by Section
6.3 hereof, the Board of Managers of the [George Osmond
Estates Council] may levy a special assessment for the
purpose of defraying, in whole or in part, the cost of any
construction or reconstruction, unexpected repair or
replacement of any capital improvements upon the Common
Area, including the necessary fixtures and personal property
related thereto, provided that any such assessment shall have
the assert of two-thirds (2/3) of the votes of the [George
Osmond Estates Council] who are voting in person or by
proxy at a meeting duly called for this purpose, written notice
of which shall be sent to all members at least thirty (30) days
in advance and shall set forth the purpose of the meeting.
Declaration 6.4. (Emphasis added.)
70.

Under the Declaration, no assessments "shall be used for capital

improvements or expenditures" unless approved by a vote of "two-thirds of the
membership of the Council and mortgagee:"
No assessments or fees hereunder shall be used for capital
improvements or expenditures unless approved by a vote of
two-thirds of the membership of the Council and mortgagees.
Declaration, Section 6.2.
71.

The Association did not hold any meeting or conducted any vote to

authorize the construction of the two retaining walls on the Property, or to authorize the
levy of the $1,450.00 "special assessment" (or any other special assessment) to fund the
construction of the two retaining walls on the Property. R. 1547, pp. 149-51.
72.

Under the Declaration, no "wall" "shall be constructed" unless the "plans
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and specifications" for the wall have first been approved "in writing" by the Architectural
and Planning Control Board of the George Osmond Estate Council:
No building, outbuilding, fence, wall, or other improvements
that are not already located on such property shall be
constructed, erected or maintained, nor shall any additions
thereto, or alteration therein, be made until plans and
specifications showing the design, color, location, materials,
landscaping and such other information relating to such
improvement as the [Architectural and Planning Control
Board of the George Osmond Estate Council] may reasonably
require shall have been submitted to and approved by the
[Architectural and Planning Control Board of the George
Osmond Estate Council] in writing.
Declaration, Section 3.3.
73.

The Association did not approve in writing (or otherwise) the "plans and

specifications" for the two retaining walls constructed on the Property. R. 1547, pp. 149151.6
74.

Under the Declaration, the due date for any "special assessment" is to be

fixed "in the resolution authorizing such assessment:"
The due date of any special assessments under Section 6.4

6

During direct examination, Anderson refused to directly answer the question of
whether there had been any approval of the plans and specifications for the two retaining
walls on the Property. Anderson claimed that the letter assessing all homeowners $1,450
was sent out "by the members of the architectural board" and constituted "written
approval" of the plans and specifications for the two walls. R. 1547, pg. 150. That letter
was not introduced as an exhibit at trial. That letter was dated August 20, 2005 - after
construction of the two retaining walls had been completed - and therefore could not have
constituted prior written approval of the plans and specifications for the two retaining
walls. R. 1548, pg. 328.
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hereof shall be fixed in the resolution authorizing such
assessment.
Declaration, Section 6.5. (Emphasis added.)
75.

The Association did not adopt any resolution authorizing the construction of

the two retaining walls, authorizing the $1,450.00 special assessments to pay for the two
retaining walls or "fixing" the "due dates" for payment of the $1,450.00 special
assessment. R. 1547, pp. 151-155.
76.

Under the Declaration, any "exterior maintenance" expense incurred by the

George Osmond Estates Council with respect to a specific property was to be assessed as
part of the "annual assessment charge" against that property, with one-half of that "annual
assessment charge" to be due on January 1 and one-half to be due on July 1 of the next
year:
The cost of such exterior maintenance shall be assessed
against the parcel upon which such maintenance is done, and
shall then be added to and became part of the annual
assessment charge or charges...
The annual assessment provided for herein shall be payable in
semiannual installments, one-half of each of the annual
assessments on the first day of January and July of each year.
Declaration, Section 6.6.
77.

The Association did not assess the $32,878.92 charge for the two retaining

walls as part of the 2006 annual maintenance assessment for the Property, or assess onehalf of the $32,878.92 charge for the two retaining walls on January 1, 2006 and one-half
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on July 1, 2006, but demanded immediate payment in full R. 1548, pg. 350.
78.

On September 18, 2006, Landrith filed a Motion for Summary Judgment to

dismiss this case on the grounds that the only entity authorized to act under the
Declaration was a nonprofit corporation entitled the "George Osmond Estates Council" which had never been organized - and that the Association was not authorized under the
Declaration to act in any way with respect to the Property. R. 53-69.
79.

On January 18, 2007, the Court denied Landrith's Motion for Summary

Judgment. R. 396-400. A copy of thai Killing is attached hereto as Addendum E.
80.

in denying Landrith's Motion for Summary Judgment, the Court relied on

Swan Creek Village Homeowners Ass'n v. Warne. 2006 UT 22, 134 P.3d 1122 (Utah
2006), finding that George Landrith had "ratified" the Association's authority to act as the
George Osmond Estates Council under the Declaration. Ruling, dated January 18, ..MI07.
R. 396-400, attached hereto as Addendum E.
81.

On February 16, 2007, the Association filed a Motion for Summary

Judgment as to all issues in the case, including a request that the Court affirm the
Association's authority to act as the George Osmond Estates Council tunic i I he
Declaration. R. 401-475.
82.

In response to the Association's Motion for Summary Judgment, Landrith

submitted detailed evidence of his repeated opposition to the Association's authority to
act under the Declaration. R. ^00-Mi.
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83.

Landrith also submitted the Affidavit of Riley Bratt ("Bratt"), an employee

of Bratt, Inc., a licensed landscapes design and excavation company, who had been
building rock retaining walls for seven years. R. 680-682.
84.

Bratt testified that the erosion problem in the southeast corner of the

Landrith Property could have been resolved by installing a rock wall (rather than a
keystone interlocking brick wall), at a base cost of $7,252.00, that "could increase by up
to an additional $4,200." I d
85.

Mr. Landrith also filed his own affidavit, averring that the "work performed

by the [Association] exceeded the scope of work required to cure any legitimate safety
and/or general maintenance issue that may have existed" and that the "amount charged by
the [Association] is much more than the amount needed to satisfactorily repair any
erosion problem that may have existed in my backyard." R. 529-530.
86.

The trial court granted the Association's Motion for Summary Judgment as

to the Association's authority to act as the George Osmond Estates Council under the
Declaration, again finding that Landrith had ratified the Association's authority to act as
the George Osmond Estates Council under the Declaration. R. 706-708. A copy of that
Order is attached hereto as Addendum F.
87.

The trial court found, however, that "the affidavits of Mr. Landrith and Mr.

Bratt put [at] issue the appropriateness of the remedy and the appropriateness of the
expense:"
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I believe the affidavits oi Mr. Landrith and Mi. Bratt put into
issue, into dispute the appropriateness of the remedy and the
appropriateness of the expense...I simply believe there's a
factual dispute, I think that's an issue that cannot be resolved
on summary judgment and I'm going to deny summary
judgment [on that issue].
Transcript of April 26, 2007 hearing, pp. 38-39.
88.

On December 4 and 5, 2008, a Jury trial was held in this matter.

89.

At the trial, Bratt listened to the testimony of Kirk Johnson, the individual

that installed the two retaining walls, as to how those two retaining walls were
constructed. R. 1548, pg. 292.
90.

Prior to trial, Bratt had also reviewed the engineering plans that Kirk

Johnson used to construct the two interlocking brick retaining walls. R. 1548, pg. 292.
91.

Prior to trial, Bratt also physically visited the site to determine the

feasability and cost of installing a rock wall to "resolve the erosion problem. R. 1:>48,
pp. 287-88.
92.

At trial, Bratt attempted to testify that a rock retaining wall would have

resolved the erosion problem and would have been a much less expensive alternative. R.
1548, pp. 289-304.
93.

The Association objected to that testimony on the grounds that Bratt was

not qualified to testify as an expert under Rule 702 of the Utah Rules of Evidence and that
Bratt's testimony was not relevant to any issue in this case. Id.
94.

The Court granted that objection on both grounds. R. 1548, pp. 289-304.
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14
95.

After both sides had rested, the Association moved for a directed verdict on

Landrith's defenses that the Association had materially breached the Declaration, had
breached its implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing, had waived its right to
recover the cost of constructing the two retaining walls and had failed to mitigate its
damages. R. 1548, pg. 375.
96.

The trial court granted that motion for directed verdict as to all four

defenses. R. 1548, pp. 381-82, 387-89.
97.

In dismissing Landrith's defense that the Association had materially

breached the Declaration, the trial court found that the homeowners associations are not
held to the same standard of compliance with recorded declarations as a "normal
corporation:"
The other thing is that in the case law the appellate courts
have not treated a homeowner's association with the
specificity and with requirements of a normal corporation.
They've treated them more in an equitable fashion as it relates
to intent as opposed to, you know, whether or not there was
formal minutes kept and you know, a variety of things that
way.
R. 1548, pg. 373.
98.

After a short deliberation, the Jury returned a verdict awarding the

Association $33,143.62, answering each question 8-0 in favor of the Association. R.
1456-57. A copy of that Special Verdict is attached hereto as Addendum G.
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99.

The difference between the amounl staled in tin Nnlm ol 1 ini

($32,878.92) and the amount awarded in the verdict ($33,143.62) were a May 15, 2006
and a July 15, 2008 invoice from Rainmaker of Utah in the amount of $74.20 and
$161.00, respectively, for subsequent work the Association ordered on the Pioperty again withoul I Jiidrith's knowledge or consent.
100.

On December 15, 2008, the Association filed a Revised Calculation of

Interest requesting interest in the amount of $10,627.75.7 R. 1509-1511.
101.

The Association requested interest "from the date the debt was incurred"

pursuant to Utah Code Annotated Section ii>-l-l(2) at a rate of 10% per annum, lor a
total of $10,627.75 in interest, rather than pursuant to method of calculating interest set
forth in the Declaration. R. 1510, 1520.
102.

Landrith objected to the Association's method of calculating of interest, on

the grounds that interest should be calculated pursuant to the provisions of the
Declaration rather than pursuant to Utah Code Annotated, Section 15-1-1(2), which
would have resulted in $1,750.00 less pre-judgment interest. R. 1528-32.
103

Without explanation, the court overruled Landrith's objection and awarded

the Association the amount of interest it requested - $10,627.75. R. 1522-24.

7

On December 12, 2008, the Association filed a Notice of Calculation of Interest.
R. 1468-1505. The only difference between the Notice of Calculation of interest and the
Revised Notice of Calculation of Interest was that in that the later the Association added
two additional months of interest - November and December 2008. Cf R. 1468-1505 and
R. 1509-1511.
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104.

The Declaration provides that in the event a judgment is obtained, such

judgment shall include "reasonable attorney's fees." Declaration, Section 6.8.
105.

The Association filed a claim for $59,83 L90 in attorney's fees. R. 1476-

106.

Landrith objected to reasonableness of the amount of attorney's fees

95.

claimed by the Association. R. 1528-32.
107.

Without explanation, the Court overruled Landrith's objection and awarded

the Association all attorney's fees requested ($59,831.90.) R. 1522-1524.
108.

The Association claimed $1,813.02 in costs. R. 1476-95.

109.

Landrith objected to $403.82 in costs. R. 1528-1532.

110.

In response to that objection, the Association stated that "it would accept a

reduction of costs...in the amount of $329.89," leaving a balance of $1,485.13. R. 1514.
111.

The Association nevertheless submitted a form of Judgment which included

the full amount of costs claimed - $1,815.02 - which the Court granted without
explanation. R. 1522-1524.
112.

On January 13, 2009, a Judgment was entered in favor of the Association.

Id. A copy of that Judgment is attached hereto as Addendum H.
113.

On February 5, 2009, Landrith filed a Notice of Appeal. R. 1540.
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT

The trial court errored in denying Landrith's Motion for Summary Judgment to
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dismiss the Complaii it oi i tl le gi 01 11 ids that tl i.e Association did not have authority to act as
the "George Osmond Estates Council" under the Declaration. The trial court also errored
in granting the Association's Motion for Summary Judgment and finding that, even if all
facts were viewed in a light most favorable to Landnth. dial I here was no "material issue
of fact" that 1andritl1111id ratified the Association's authority to act as the George
Osmond Estate Council under the Declaration.
The Association is separate and distinct from the "George Osmond Estates
Council" and operates in a manner signifi.can.tly differei it flt.ui (lit: manner in w Inch the
George Osmond Estates Council is described as operating under the Declaration.
Landrith has repeatedly objected to the Association's claim that it had authority to act as
the George Osmond Estates Council under the Declaration.
The trial court errored in precluding Riley Bratt ("Bratt") from testifvinr

ial as

an expert witness as to a less expensive alternative method of resolving the erosion
problem. The trial court also errored in granting the Association's motion for directed
verdict as to Landrith's defenses that the Association had failed to mitigate its damages,
had material!)'11 breached the Declaration by failing to coi t ipl> w ith certain, applicable
provisions of the Declaration, had waived its right for reimbursement and had breached
its implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing. Finally, the trial court errored in
overruling all of Landrith's objections as to the costs, interest and attorney's fees claimed
by the Association.
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DISCUSSION
I. THE TRIAL COURT ERRORED IN DENYING LANDRITH'S MOTION FOR
SUMMARY JUDGMENT AND GRANTING THE ASSOCIATION'S MOTION FOR
SUMMARY JUDGMENT.
Landrith filed a Motion for Summary Judgment to dismiss the Complaint on the
grounds that the only entity authorized to act under the Declaration was the George
Osmond Estates Council, a non-profit corporation - not the Association - which is the
plaintiff in this case. In response, the Association claimed that Landrith had ratified the
Association's authority to act as the George Osmond Estates Council under the
Declaration. The trial court agreed with the Association, relying on Swancreek Village
Homeowners Association vs. Warne, 134 P.3d 1122 (Utah 2006). The trial court
subsequently granted the Association's Motion for Summary Judgment finding that there
was "no material issue of fact in dispute" as to the fact that Landrith had "ratified" the
Association's authority to act as the George Osmond Estates Council under the
Declaration.
In Swancreek, the homeowners association identified in a recorded declaration was
incorporated in 1979. In 1986, that corporation was involuntarily dissolved by the State
of Utah for failure to make an annual filing. In 1988, because that homeowners
association waited more than one year after its dissolution to try to reinstate the old
corporation, and therefore the old corporation could not be reinstated, the association
reincorporated under the same name and continued to operate in the same manner as the
28

first corporation. In 20(

lomeowner tried to avoid pa,)/ n lei it of 1: i :>:t i leowner

association dues by claiming that the second corporation didn't have authority to act
under the declaration since it was "technically" a different corporation than the
corporation originally incorporated pursuant to the declaration.
The Swancreek Court, foi 11 id that wl lere pi operty owner s 1 lav e "treated on
association as one with authority to act" pursuant to the terms of a recorded declaration,
"they ratify the association's authority to act" under the declaration:
Where property owners have treated an association as one
with authority to govern and impose assessments
contemplated under the terms of a duly recorded governing
declaration, they ratify its authority to act.
Id at 1128.
The Swancreek Court held that finding such a ratification "prevents parties from avoiding
valid objections due to technicalities:"
The availability of equitable relief helps ensure that justice is
met and prevents parties from avoiding valid obligations due
to technicalities.
Id at 1129.
The facts in this case are much different tl lai I those in Swancreek. In this case,
there was no factual basis for finding that the Association ever had authority to act as the
George Osmond Estates Council under the Declaration, or that any "ratification" had
taken place by Landrith.
A. The Association did not organize itself as the George Osmond Estates Council.
29

The Declarations were recorded in 1977 and contemplated that a non-profit
corporation titled the "George Osmond Estates Council" would be created at a future
date. That entity was never created. Instead, in approximately 1979, an "unincorporated
association" identifying itself as the "Osmond Lane Homeowners Association" began
acting as a "homeowner's association" in the Subdivision, to wit: addressing common
concerns, collecting homerowner dues and paying for common expenses. If the
Association had intended to be the "George Osmond Estates Council" described in the
Declaration the Association would have organized itself as the "George Osmond Estates
Council" as described in the Declaration - a non-profit organization called the "George
Osmond Estates Council."
Unlike Swancreek, the Association never was the entity authorized to act under the
Declaration, and at no time organized itself to be the entity described in the Declaration.
This is not a "technicality" of a corporation being dissolved for failure to make an annual
filing and then reincorporating under the same name because the time to reinstate had
passed. The Association intentionally chose not to organize itself as the entity authorized
to act under the Declaration.
B. The Association does not operate like the George Osmond Estates Council.
The Association does not operate the way the George Osmond Estates Council is
described as operating under the Declaration. The "George Osmond Estates Council"
was to be organized as a non-profit corporation. The Association is an unincorporated
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association. I he "George Osnioi id Estates Council" was to be governed by "Board of
Managers." The Association is governed by president, vice-president and secretary. The
Declaration provided that homeowners were to have "voting rights" as "specified in the
Articles of Incorporation" for the George Osmond Estates Council, The Associatioii has
no "Articles :)fIiicorporation" arid has created no document granting the homeowners any
"voting rights." The George Osmond Estates Council was to make "annual assessments/'
one-half of which would be due on January 1 and July 1 of each year. The Association
makes annual assessments that are due in

fin

January 10 of each year. The George

Osmond Estate Council was to provide copies of its articles of incorporation and the bylaws to all new purchasers of property within the Subdivision. The Association does not
provide copies of any articles of incorporation or any other organizational documents to
new purchasers. Even after the Association won at trial, tl le < Association relied oi I I Itah
Code Annotated, Section 15-1-1(2) for the method of calculating pre-judgment interest,
rather Sections 6.6, 6.8 and 6.12 of the Declaration. The Association has not even tried to
operate as the George Osmond Estates Council is described as operating under the
Declaration.
In Swancreek, the homeowners association operated as the homeowners
association that was described in the recorded declarations.
C. Until recently, the Association didn't claim authority to act as the George
Osmond Estates Council under the Declaration.
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Since it began operating in 1979, the Association has filed "mechanic's liens" to
collect unpaid homeowners association fees, rather than collect them pursuant to the
Declaration. Other than Landrith, the Association records identify no other property
owner against whom the Association has taken any action, claiming authority to act as the
George Osmond Estates Council under the Declaration. In his Affidavit, even Anderson
never claims that the Association has ever taken any action against any homeowner, other
than Landrith, claiming authority to act as the George Osmond Estates Council under the
Declaration.
In Swancreek, since its inception the homeowner's association had asserted
authority to act as the homeowner's association described in the recorded declaration.
D. Landrith repeatedly objected to the Association's claim that it had authority to
act under the Declaration.
Since purchasing the Property in 1992, Landrith has recognized the Association as
a homeowner's association organized to address common concerns, collect homeowner
dues, and pay common expenses, but nothing more. In particular, Landrith has never
acknowledged, consented to or otherwise ratified the Association as having authority to
act under the Declaration.
The first time the Association took any action against Landrith claiming authority
to act under the Declaration was in 2002 when the Association filed the 2002 Notice of
Lien against the Property and commenced the 2002 Action to collect $604.00 in costs and
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attorney's fees. The Association served Landrith by publication and obtained a Default
Judgment. At the Writ of Execution hearing, Landrith disputed the Association's
authority to file the Notice of Lien or commence the 2002 Action. The Court refused to
consider Landrith's arguments on the merits inasmuch as a Default Judgment had been
entered.
On November 14, 2002, the Association filed another Notice of Lien against
Landrith's property for $1,113.50 for "yard and lawn maintenance." Once again,
Landrith objected. On December 3, 2002, Landrith paid that amount to the Association
under protest - stating in the accompanying letter that "my payment of this invoice is
NOT any agreement on my part of the legitimacy of the enclosed invoice." See
Addendum C hereto.
In 2004, the Association performed $5,103.00 in repairs to the Property - again
without Landrith's consent. In a May 15, 2004, telephone conversation between Anderson
and Landrith, Landrith agreed to pay $5,103.00, but only after the Association had agreed
that it would make no future repairs to the Property without "prior notice and discussions
with [Landrith.]" See Addendum I hereto.
Each time the Association has taken action against Landrith claiming authority to
act under the Declaration, Landrith has objected. Landrith has recognized the Association
as what it is - an unincorporated association of homeowners in the Subdivision that is
addressing common homeowners concerns, collecting annual dues and paying common
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expenses of homeowners within the Subdivision - but nothing more. Landrith's payment
of annual dues to the Association does not mean that Landrith recognized the Association
as having authority to act under the Declaration. It is not necessary to have authority to
act under a recorded declaration to collect homeowners dues. The Association enforces
collection of unpaid homeowners dues by filing mechanics liens, not pursuant to the
Declaration.
The trial court's decision to grant summary judgment is reviewed "for correctness,
granting no deference to the [district] court." Pugh v. Draper City, 2005 UT 12, ^} 7, 114
P.3d 546 (Utah 2005). "[SJummary judgment is appropriate only when there is no
genuine issue as to any material fact and the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a
matter of law." Norman v. Arnold, 2002 UT 81, % 15, 57 P.3d 997 (Utah 2002). In
reviewing a motion for summary judgment, all facts and inferences are to be reviewed in
a light most favorable to the non-moving party. Surety Underwriters v. E&C Trucking,
Inc., 2000 UT 71,115, 10 P.3d 338 (Utah 2000).
Where a motion for summary judgment is denied, and the issue raised therein is
considered at trial, the appellate court will not consider whether the trial court errored in
denying the motion for summary judgment. Normandeau vs. Hanson Equipment, Inc.,
174 P.3d 1 (Utah App. 2007.) In this case, where Landrith's Motion for Summary
Judgment was denied but the issue raised therein was not considered at trial since the
Association's Motion for Summary Judgment on the same issue was granted, the trial
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court's denial of Landrith's Motion for Summary Judgment should also be reviewed for
correctness. In reviewing the trial court's denial of Landrith's Motion for Summary
Judgment, based on the clear distinction between the facts in Swancreek and the facts in
this case, the trial court errored in denying Landrith's Motion for Summary Judgment.
The trial court also errored in granting the Association's Motion for Summary Judgment.
Viewing all "facts and inferences" in a light most favorable to Landrith, at best there was
a genuine issue of material fact as to whether Landrith ever ratified the Association's
claim that it had authority to act under the Declaration.
II. THE TRIAL COURT ERRORED IN EXCLUDING RILEY BRATT AS AN
EXPERT WITNESS.
The trial court errored in excluding Bratt's testimony at trial on the grounds that he
was not qualified as an expert witness under Rule 702 of the Utah Rules of Evidence and
that his testimony was not relevant.
A. Bratt was qualified as an expert witness under Rule 702.
Rule 702 of the Utah Rules of Evidence provides the standard for admissibility of
expert testimony. A copy of Rule 702 of the Utah Rules of Evidence is attached hereto as
Addendum D. "The decision whether to admit or exclude expert testimony generally
involves a preliminary issue of fact for the court under Utah Rule of Evidence Rule
104(a)... The trial court's admission of expert testimony is within the trial court's
discretion and its ruling will be upheld absent an abuse of discretion." See, e.g., State v.
Martin. 44 P.3d 805, 811 (Utah 2002); State v. Butterfield. 27 P.3d 1133, 1139 (Utah
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2001); Brewer v. Denver & Rio Grande Western Railroad. 31 P.3d 557 (Utah 2001).
However, the Utah Supreme Court has made it clear that an expert evidence ruling will be
reversed if erroneous, especially where the trial court has imposed too high a burden for
admissibility. See e ^ , Green v. Louder. 29 P.3d 638, 645 (Utah 2001).
(i) Bratt satisfied the requirements of Rule 702(a). Under Rule 702(a),
Bratt had to be "qualified by knowledge, skill, experience, training, or education" to
testify as to whether a rock retaining wall to resolve the erosion problem and the cost
thereof. Utah R. Evid. 702(a). In this case, Bratt was employed by Bratt, Inc., a licensed
landscaping, design and excavation company, and had been constructing rock retaining
walls for seven years. Bratt was clearly qualified by "knowledge, skill, experience,
education, or training" to testify as to whether a rock retaining wall would have resolved
the erosion problem on the Property and the cost thereof.
(ii) Bratt satisfied the requirements of Rule 702(b). The trial court must
also determine whether Bratt's testimony meets a "threshold" showing that his methods
and testimony (i) are reliable, (ii) are based upon sufficient facts or data, and (iii) have
been reliably applied to the facts of the case. Utah R. Evid. 702(b). In this case, Bratt
visited the site where the erosion took place, reviewed the plans and specifications
prepared by the Association's engineer to repair the erosion, and listened to the testimony
at trial of Kirk Johnson, the individual that actually installed the "interlocking brick"
retaining wall. Clearly, Bratt had satisfied this "threshold."
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B. Bratt's testimony was relevant.
Bratt's testimony was relevant to Landrith's defenses that the Association had
breached its duty to mitigate damages. The relevance of Bratt's testimony is discussed
below in the section discussing that defense.
C. The trial court had previously recognized Bratt as qualified and Bratt's
testimony as relevant.
Prior to trial, the trial court recognized Bratt's testimony as admissible and
relevant. In denying the Association's Motion for Summary Judgment on this issue, the
court found that "the affidavits of Mr. Landrith and Mr. Bratt put [at] issue the
appropriateness of the remedy and the appropriateness of the expense." The law of the
case provides that "decision[s] made on issuefs] during one stage of a case are binding on
successive stages of the same litigation. Mid-America Pipeline Co. v. Four-Four, Inc.,
2009 UT 43, ^ 12, 216 P.3d 352, 355 (internal quotation marks omitted.) The trial court's
reversal at trial of its prior ruling on this same issue - without explanation - was without
basis and should be reversed.
III. THE TRIAL COURT ERRORED IN GRANTING THE ASSOCIATION'S
MOTIONS FOR DIRECTED VERDICT.
A. The trial court errored in granting a directed verdict as to Landrith's defense of
failure to mitigate damages.
Under the defense of failure to mitigate damages, the Association had a duty to
"minimize" its damages resulting from Landrith's alleged failure to fix the erosion. John
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Call Engineering. Inc. v. Manti Citv Corp.. 795 P.2d 678, 680 (Utah cf. App. 1990) The
Association may not recover damages that it could have avoided with reasonable effort.
Angelos v. First Interstate Bank of Utah. 671 P.2d 772, 777 (Utah 1983). The
Association breached its duty to mitigate damages by failing to take reasonable steps to
mitigate its damages.
(i) The Association refused to allow Landrith to fix the hole. On July 23,
2004, both Landrith and Anderson met in Landrith's background. Landrith brought a
contractor to "put dirt in the hole." This is the solution that the Association had
previously requested. At that meeting, Anderson stated that this means of repairing the
erosion was "no longer acceptable." The Association breached its duty to mitigate
damages by refusing to let Landrith repair the "hole" through the contractor Landrith
brought to the July 23, 2004 meeting.
(ii) Failure to use less expensive alternative means. The Association
installed an interlocking brick retaining wall to resolve the erosion problem. The
Association's cost of repairing the erosion damage was staggering - $32,878.93. In his
affidavit, Bratt testified that the erosion problem could have been resolved by using an
alternative method (rock retaining wall) for a base cost of $7,252.00, that would not have
exceeded $11,452.00.8

8

Bratt testified that the erosion problem could have been resolved for a base cost of
$7,252.00, that could increase by up to $4,200. R. 680-682.
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The Utah courts have long recognized that the duty to mitigate damages includes a
duty to take reasonable alternative actions to mitigate damages. For example, in
Mahmood v. Ross, 990 P.2d 933 (Utah 1999), the defendant was to make payments to the
plaintiff to help repay a loan that was secured by plaintiffs property. Id. The defendant
stopped making payments, causing the plaintiffs loan to go into default and plaintiffs
property to be sold at a trustee's sale. Id. The trial court rejected defendant's claim that
plaintiff had failed to mitigate his damages. The appellate court reversed on the grounds
that the plaintiff did not act reasonably to mitigate his damages. IdL at 941. Plaintiff had
failed to act on two specific opportunities that would have mitigated his damages - selling
his secured property to pay off the loan prior to the foreclosure sale or refinancing his
loan. Id
In this case, the damage to Association was the cost of fixing the erosion problem $32,878.02. The Association could have reduced its damages to a base cost of $7,750.00
(and no more than $11,452.00) by using an alternative means - a rock retaining wall - to
fix the same problem. Bratt's testimony was clearly relevant to this defense.
In considering a motion for directed verdict the trial court is "not free to weigh the
evidence and thus invade the province of the jury, whose prerogative it is to judge the
facts. A directed verdict is only appropriate when the court is able to conclude, as a
matter of law, that reasonable minds would not differ on the facts to be determined from
the evidence presented." Management Comm. v. Gravstone Pines, Inc. 652 P.2d 896, 898
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(Utah 1982). The Utah Court of Appeals will examine "the evidence in the light most
favorable to the losing party, and if there is a reasonable basis in the evidence and in the
inferences to be drawn therefrom that would support a judgment in favor of the losing
party, the directed verdict cannot be sustained." Tolman v. Winchester Hills Water Co..
Inc., 912 P.2d 457, 461 (Utah App. 1996). In this case, "viewing the evidence in a light
most favorable to [Landrith]," the directed verdict dismissing Landrith's mitigation of
damages defense cannot be sustained.
B. The trial court errored in granting a directed verdict as to Landrith's defense of
material breach by the Association.
The Association constructed two retaining walls in the southeast corner of the
Property - at a cost of $32,878.92 - without Landrith's knowledge or consent. At that
time Landrith was living in Bountiful and the Property was on the market for sale. The
construction of the two walls involved extensive work on the Property, including
construction of a ramp along the west side of the Property and behind the Property to
allow construction equipment to access the southeast corner of the Property. It was only
after construction had been completed that Landrith first became aware of the
construction. The cost of construction was funded by a special assessment of $1,450.00
by the Association against the other homeowners in the Subdivision.
The Association breached the Declaration by failing to approve in writing the
plans and specifications for the two retaining walls, by failing to give Landrith notice that
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the Association was entering his Property, by assessing the $1,450.00 special assessment
without first obtaining the consent of 2/3 rd of the homeowner, and by failing to adopt a
resolution authorizing constructions of the two retaining walls.
(i) No approved plans. Under the Declaration, no "wall" "shall be
constructed" unless the "plans and specifications" for the wall had first been approved "in
writing" by the George Osmond Estate Architectural and Planning Control Board.
Declaration, Section 3.3. The Association did not approved in writing the "plans and
specifications" for the two retaining walls constructed on the Property.
(ii) No notice prior to entry of the Property. Under the Declaration, the
George Osmond Estates Council had to first give "reasonable notice" to Landrith before
entering the Property to perform any maintenance. Declaration, Section 6.13. The
Association did not give Landrith any notice that it was entering his Property to construct
the two retaining walls.
(iii) No vote authorizing $1,450.00 special assessment. Under the
Declaration, the Board of Managers of the George Osmond Estates Council "may levy a
special assessment" for the "cost of any construction or reconstruction," but only if "such
assessment shall have the assent of two-thirds (2/3) of the homeowners and that notice of
such a meeting shall be sent to all members at least thirty (30) days in advance of the
meeting." Declaration, Section 6.4. Similarly, no assessments shall be "used for capital
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improvements9 or expenditures" unless approved by a vote of "two-thirds of the
membership of the Council and mortgagee." Declaration, Section 6.2. The Association
did not hold any meeting or conducted any vote to authorize the construction of the two
retaining walls on the Property, or to authorize the levy of the $1,450.00 "special
assessment" to fund the construction of the two retaining walls on the Property.
(iv) No authorizing resolution. Under the Declaration, the due date for any
"special assessment" is to be fixed "in the resolution authorizing such assessment."
Declaration, Section 6.5. The Association did not adopt any resolution authorizing the
construction of the two retaining walls, authorizing the $1,450.00 special assessments to
pay for the two retaining walls or "fixing" the "due dates" for payment of the $1,450.00
special assessment assessed by the Association to pay for the two retaining walls.
In granting the Association's motion for directed verdict on Landrith's defense that
the Association had materially breached the Declaration, the trial court found that the
standard for a homeowners associations complying with a recorded declaration is not the
same as a "normal corporation." Therefore, the Association's failure to comply with the
foregoing provisions of the Declaration did not give rise to a defense that the Association
had materially breached the Declarations. The trial court errored in this ruling.

9

One of the Jury Instruction submitted by Landrith provided a definition of
"Capital Improvements" to assist the Jury in determining whether the two retaining walls
constituted "capital improvements." After the Association's motion for directed verdict
was granted, that Jury Instruction was not use.
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A recorded declaration is a contract between the homeowners association and its
members. In Swan Creek Village Homeowners Ass'n v. Warne, 134 P.3d 1122 (Utah
2006), the Utah Supreme Court held that the validity of an assessment against a property
owner "turns upon the specific provisions of the declaration establishing the homeowners
associations and conferring its assessment authority." Id. at 1131. The Court continued
by stating that, " \ . .both Utah statutes and case law recognizes that such associations are
controlled by their governing documents, which in fact constitute a contract between the
association and the property owners." Id. (Emphasis added.) The Court's reasoning is
consistent with the Community Association Act which states that the amount and timing
of any assessment must be "in accordance with the terms of the.. .declaration." Utah
Code Ann. § 57-8a-201(2) (Supp. 2005).
If the Association failed to comply with a material provision of the Declaration,
the breach would excuse the homeowner's obligation to perform. "[T]he law is well
settled that a material breach by one party to a contract excuses further performance by
the non-breaching party." Coalville City v. Lundgren. 930 P.2d 1206, 1209 (Utah App.
1997.) In Jackson v. Rich. 499 P.2d 279 (Utah 1972), the Court held "[a]s a rule, a party
first guilty of a substantial or material breach of contract cannot complain if the other
party thereafter refuses to perform. He can neither insist on performance by the other
party nor maintain an action against the other party for a subsequent failure to perform."
Id. at 280.

43

Sections 3.3, 6.13 and 6.65 of the Declaration were to be complied with prior to
commencement of construction and Sections 6.2 and 6.4 prior to assessment of the
$1,450.00 special assessment, and as such were also conditions precedent to the
Association either commencing construction or levying the $1,450.00 special assessment.
Failure to perform a condition precedent also excuses performance:
Where the duty of the obligor to perform is contingent upon
the occurrence or existence of a condition precedent, the
obligee may not require performance by the obligor, because
the obligor's duty, and conversely the obligee's right to
demand performance, does not arise until that condition
occurs or exists.
Harper v. Great Salt Lake Council Inc.. 976 P.2d 1213, 1217 (Utah 1999).
Since the Declaration constituted a contract between Landrith and the Association,
Landrith was entitled to rely on the Association's obligation to keep the covenants
imposed on the Association by the Declaration. The Association did not obtain a 2/3rd's
vote of the homeowners prior to assessing the $1,450.00 special assessment to the
homeowners to pay for the two retaining walls as required by Sections 6.2 and 6.4 of the
Declaration. The Association did not notify Landrith that it intended to enter the Property
for purposes of constructing the two retaining walls as required by Section 6.13 of the
Declaration. The Association did not obtain written approval for the "plans and
specifications for the wall from an "architectural committee" prior to commencement of
construction as required by Section 3.3 of the Declaration. The Association did not adopt
a resolution authority construction of the wall on the Property or imposing the $1,450.00
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special assessment as required by Section 6.5 of the Declaration.
In Johannessen v. Canyon Road Towers Owners Ass'n. 57 P.3d 1119, 1124 (Utah
App. 2002), the Utah Court of Appeals affirmed a trial court's ruling that a homeowners
association did not follow the association's declaration when it lowered the plaintiffs
monthly assessment without the consent of all the unit owners, and therefore the
agreement was invalid. See also Levanger v. Vincent, 3 P.3d 187 (Utah App. 2000)
(holding that a voting procedure adopted by a homeowner's association that was not in
compliance with the recorded declaration was invalid and the vote taken thereunder was
void.)
Similarly, because the Association materially breached the Declaration, its claim
for reimbursement against Landrith is unenforceable. In viewing the facts in a "light
most favorable" to Landrith, there was a "reasonable basis in the evidence and in the
inferences to be drawn therefrom that would support a judgment in favor o f Landrith.
Tolman at 461. Landrith was entitled to have the Jury determine whether the Association
materially breached the Declaration, thereby excusing performance. The trial court
errored in granting the Association's motion for directed verdict on this issue.
C. The trial court errored in granting a directed verdict as to Landrith's defense of
breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing by the Association.
The implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing requires a party's actions to be
consistent with the agreed upon common purpose and the justified expectations of the
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other party. When one party to a contract retains power or sole discretion in an express
contract, it must exercise that discretion reasonably and in good faith. Cook v. Zions First
Nat'l Bank, 919 P.2d 56, 60 (Utah App. 1996). St. Benedict's Dev. Co. v. St. Benedict's
Hosp.. 811 P.2d 194, 200 (Utah 1991.)
The Association's actions were inconsistent with the common purpose and
justified expectations of Landrith under the Declaration. By July 2004, Landrith had
moved to Bountiful, Utah and the Property was vacant. On May 15, 2004, Anderson and
Landrith agreed that the Association would make no further repairs to the Property
without Landrith's knowledge or consent. At a July 2004 meeting at the Property,
Anderson told Landrith that it would cost at least $100,000.00 to fix the erosion but that if
Landrith would sell the Property to him for $200,000.00 then Landrith would not have to
worry about fixing the erosion. On July 23, 2004, Landrith brought a contractor to the
Property to "fill the hole." At that meeting, Anderson stated that filling the "hole" with
dirt was "no longer acceptable" and reiterated that it was going to cost at least
$100,000.00 to fix the erosion. When Landrith rejected Anderson's $200,000 offer to
purchase the Property, Anderson ordered construction of the two retaining walls on the
Property, without Landrith's knowledge or consent, without complying with the
Declarations and without complying with the May 15, 2004 agreement.
Anderson claimed he did so because he was concerned about the "safety" of
children in the neighborhood. However, there was no testimony at trial that any children
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had ever been seen on or near the Property. Neither Provo City nor any other
governmental entity had ever cited the erosion as being unsafe or otherwise violating any
ordinance.
Landrith had a justified expectation that Anderson would not use the Association
to advance his own personal pecuniary interests. A fact finder could have concluded that
Anderson did not order construction of the two retaining walls because he was concerned
about the "safety" of children in the neighborhood, but in retaliation for Landrith's
rejection of his offer to purchase the Property for $200,000.00. A fact finder could have
also concluded that the Anderson's decision to fix the hole for $32,878.92 was not
exercised "reasonably" or "in good faith." The erosion could have been fixed at a much
lower cost. However, Anderson wanted to impose the greatest cost possible on Landrith.
D. The trial court errored in granting a directed verdict as to Landrith's defense of
waiver by the Association.
A waiver of a right has occurred where a right exists, a person has knowledge of
that right and the totality of circumstances warrants the interference of a relinquishment
of that right by that person. IHC Health Service, Inc. v. D&K Management, Inc., 73 P.3d
320 (Utah 2003.)
In 1977, the Declaration was recorded, granting the George Osmond Estates
Council certain powers with respect to property located within the Subdivision. When the
Association organized in 1979, it did not organize as the "George Osmond Estates

47

Council"- the entity identified in Declaration. The Association did not incorporate as a
non-profit corporation, did not adopt any organizing document granting voting rights, did
not give copies of its Articles of Incorporation (or other organizing documents) to new
purchasers, did not assess one-half of the annual assessments on January 1 and one-half
on July 1 of each year, all as the George Osmond Estates Council was required to do
under the Declaration. The Association collected unpaid assessments through recording
"mechanics liens"- not pursuant to the Declaration.
If the Association wanted to be the George Osmond Estates Council, it would have
organized as the George Osmond Estates Council and it would have operated as the
George Osmond Estates Council was described as operating under the Declaration. A
fact finder could have found that the Association's intentional decision to organize and
operate as something different than the George Osmond Estates Council evidenced an
"intentional relinquishment of [the] right" to claim the authority to act as the George
Osmond Estates Council under the Declaration.
IV. INTEREST WAS NOT CALCULATED CORRECTLY IN THE JUDGMENT
The Declaration provides that in the event the Association incurs a maintenance
cost with respect to a property, the assessment of the maintenance costs shall become
"part of the annual assessment" and shall be "due and payable as provided in Article VI."
Declaration, Section 6.12. Article VI of the Declaration provides that annual assessment
charges are to be "payable in semi-annual installments," with one-half of the amount is
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due on January 1st and one-half on July 1st of each year. Declaration, Section 6.6. If the
payment is not made within 30 days of the due date (i.e., Vi by the following January 31st
and July 31st, respectively) then interest begins to accrued at 10% per annum. Declaration,
Section 6.8.
In this case, had the $32,878.92 set forth in the Notice of Lien been charged in
accordance with the Declaration, one-half ($16,439.36) would have been due on January
1, 2006 and one-half ($16,439.36) would have been due on July 1, 2006. Pursuant to
Section 6.8 of the Declaration, $16,439.36 would have accrued interest at 10% per annum
from January 31, 2006 through January 12, 2009 (the date the Judgment was entered), and
$16,439.36 would have accrued interest at 10% per annum from July 31, 2006 through
January 12, 2009 - for a total of approximately $8,877.25 in interest. Interest on the two
subsequent invoices from Rainmaker of Utah (the May 15, 2006 invoice of $74.20 and
the July 15, 2008 invoice of $161.00), calculated pursuant to Section 6.8 the Declaration
would constitute an additional $25.49 of interest, for a total of $8,902.74.
In requesting an award of interest the Association ignored that provisions of the
Declaration, instead requesting interest "from the date the debt was incurred" pursuant to
Utah Code Annotated Section 15-1-1(2) at a rate of 10% per annum, for a total of
$10,627.75 in interest. The form of Judgment submitted by the Association (and signed
by the Court) awarded interest pursuant to Utah Code Annotated Section 15-1-1(2).
Therein, the Court did not apply the Declaration, but instead applied only Section 15-1-
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1(2).
By its terms Utah Code Annotated Section 15-l-l-(2) does not apply where there
is a "lawful contract" between the parties that "specifies a different rate of interest." See
Utah Code Annotated, Section 15-1-1(2). While the rate of interest is the same in the
Declaration as in Section 15-1-1(2) - 10% per annum - the date from which the interest
begins to accrue is later under the Declaration than under Section 15-1-1(2).
If interest on the $33,143.62 was calculated in accordance with Section 6.8 of the
Declaration, the amount of interest would be $8,877.25, or $1,750.50 less than if
calculated pursuant to Utah Code Annotated Section 15-1-1(2). Landrith objected to the
Association's calculation of interest, arguing that interest should be calculated pursuant to
the Declaration. The trial court errored in calculating pre-judgment interest pursuant to
Section 15-1-1(2), rather than pursuant to the terms of the Declaration. A trial court's
ruling as to the legal basis for awarding interest rates is a question of law and is reviewed
for correctness. See Consolidation Coal Co. v. Utah Div. of State Lands and Forestry.
886 P.2d 514, 526 (Utah 1994.) The trial court errored in calculating interest pursuant to
Section 15-1-1(2), rather than pursuant to the Declaration.
V. THE ASSOCIATION WAS AWARDED "COSTS" THAT WERE NOT
RECOVERABLE.
The Association claimed $1,813.02 in costs. Landrith objected to the following
$403.82 in costs:
Description

Amount
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Postage to mail initial disclosures
Certified copies of Request for Hearing and Minutes of Hearing
Copies
Copies
Copies of George Landrith Deposition
Copies for deposition
Expert witness - Conrad Guymon from CKR Engineers, Inc.
Copies of Declaration on Protective Covenants from the Utah
County Recorder's Office
Total

$4.30
$9.50
$18.96
$31.45
$73.93
$5.68
$250.00
$10.00
$403.82

In response to Landrith5s objection, the Association stated that "it would accept a
reduction of costs...in the amount of $329.89," leaving a balance of $1,485.13. R. 1514.
The Association nevertheless submitted a form of Judgment which included the full
amount of costs claimed - $1,815.02 - which the Court granted. The only charge objected
to by Landrith that the Association didn't agree to withdraw was $73.93 for "copies of
George Landrith's Deposition." That is not the cost for George Landrith's deposition,
which was claimed by the Association in the amount of $929.60. This was a separate cost
for making a copy of George Landrith's deposition, which the Association already had.
That "copy cost" was not recoverable as a cost. See Beaver v. Qwest Inc.. 2001 UT 81,
31 P.3d 1147 (Utah 2001). The expert witness fee objected to by Landrith is also not
recoverable as costs. Frampton v. Wilson, 605 P.2d 771 (UT 1980.) The trial court
errored in awarding the $403.82 in costs that were objected to by Landrith.
The standard of review for award of costs is abuse of discretion. Qwest at f 25. In
this case, the trial court abused its discretion by awarding costs that the Association
admitted should not be awarded as costs, and by awarding photocopy costs. Id. (holding
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the award of photocopy costs "exceeded the permitted range of discretion" in awarding
costs.)
VI. THE AMOUNT OF ATTORNEY'S FEES CLAIMED WAS NOT
REASONABLE FOR THE SERVICES RENDERED.
The Declaration provides that in the event a judgment is obtained, such judgment
shall include "reasonable attorney's fees." Declaration, Section 6.8. The Association
claimed $59,831.90 in attorney's fees, and included an itemized list of all attorney time
claimed. Landrith filed an objection to the reasonableness of the attorney's fees claimed
by the Association on the grounds that they were excessive and included a significant
duplication of services. Without explanation, the Court overruled Landrith's objection
and awarded the Association all attorney's fees requested ($59,831.90.)
A trial court's award of attorney's fees is usually review under an abuse of
discretion standard. Dixie State Bank v. Bracken. 764 P.2d 985, 991 (Utah 1988);
Valcarce v. Fitzgerald. 961 P.2d 305, 317 (Utah 1998). However, "The trial court must
make findings of fact supporting the reasonableness of its fee award." Matter of Estate of
Ouinn. 830 P.2d 282, 285 (Utah Ct. App. 1992). "These findings must be sufficiently
detailed, and include enough subsidiary facts, to disclose the steps by which the trial
court's decision was reached." Id. at 286. When the trial court does not make findings of
fact supporting the reasonableness of its award of attorney's fees, the matter is reversed
and remanded by the appellate court. See American Vending Services, Inc., v. Morse, 881
P.2d 917, 926 (Utah Ct. App. 1994) (reversing and remanding where the court failed to
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support its decision through evidence in the record.)
In this case, Landrith objected to the reasonableness of the Association's claim for
attorney's fees. For example, at trial, Thomas Seiler candidly admitted to the Jury in
opening statements that this was his co-counsel, Aaron Lancaster's, first trial, that he was
"very new" at the practice of law and that he's "here to learn right along with you." R.
1547, pg. 12. Aaron Lancaster attended the full trial, but did not conduct any examination
or cross-examination or otherwise participate in the trial in any way. The Association
requested that Landrith pay for all of Aaron Lancaster's time at the trial (10.10 hours on
December 4, 2008 and 10.80 hours on December 5, 2008) for a total of $3,135.00.
Landrith objected to being charged for "training time" for a new attorney.
In Bruno v. Western Electric Co., 618 F. Supp. 398 (D.C. Colo. 1985), aff d in
part and rev'd in part on other grounds 829 F.2d 957 (10th Cir. 1987), defendants
objected to a claim for attorney's fees by one of the plaintiffs attorneys, who had just
recently graduated from law school was only involved for the purpose of being trained.
Id. at 404. The court agreed with the defendant and held that there is no justification for
charging this attorney's time to an opponent who has lost the case when it is to give
young people more courtroom experience. Id.
The amount of attorney's fees claimed by the Association should have been
reduced significantly to reflect the reasonable amount of time required to prosecute this
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action - exclusive of duplication of services or training time.10 The trial court errored by
failing to make any findings of fact as to the reasonableness of the fees claimed by the
Association and the award should be reversed.
VII. IF LANDRITH PREVAILS ON THIS APPEAL. LANDRITH SHOULD BE
AWARDED HIS ATTORNEY'S FEES.
If Landrith prevails on this appeal, Landrith should be awarded his attorney's fees.
The trial court award the Association its attorney's fees pursuant to Section 6.8 of the
Declaration. Where a contract allows for the award of attorney's fees to one party as the
prevailing party, the other party is also entitled to attorney's fees if he prevails. See Utah
Code Annotated, Section 78B-5-826. This is so even if the Association is determined to
have no authority to act as the George Osmond Estates Council under the Declaration.
See Bilanzich v. LonettL 2007 UT 26, 160 P.3d 1041 (Utah 2007) (awarding attorney's
fees to the prevailing party under this statute even where the contract containing fees
10

Similarly, the Association was represented by two attorney's at every hearing,
pre-trial conference, final pre-trial conference and meetings with Mr. Cline. (See time
entries for December 28, 2006, January 2, 2007, December 2, 2008, December 3, 2008,
December 4, 2008 and December 5, 2008.) For example, the entire trial was attended by
both Mr. Lancaster and Mr. Seiler (see time entries for December 4 and 5, 2008). The
Association claimed 4.50 hours ($742.50) drafting an Order granting the Association's
Motion for Summary Judgment which included rulings that the court did not make. R.
1491. Because it included rulings the Court did not make, the court rejected that form of
Order and signed defendants form of order instead. Minute Entry, R. 485. ("Ordinarily, I
allow the prevailing party to prepare the proposed order. In this matter, however, the
Order prepared by the prevailing party [the Association] is overbroad and includes ruling
that I did not make...I have this day signed the form of order prepared by defendant's
counsel.") The form of Order submitted by defendants counsel was five lines long, and
wouldn't have taken more than 2/10s of hours to dictate, proof and mail.
54

clause was invalidated.)
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, the trial court's ruling denying Landrith's Motion for
Summary Judgment should be reversed, and this matter dismissed. Landrith should be
awarded his costs and attorney's fees in appeal, and this case should be remanded for the
trial court to award Landrith attorney's fees below. Alternatively, the trial court's order
granting the Association's Motion for Summary Judgment, order precluding Bratt from
testifying at trial and order granting the Association's motion for directed verdict should
be reversed as to all four defenses and this matter remanded for re-trial. The trial court's
award of costs, attorney's fees and pre-judgment interest should also be reversed.
Dated this [0

day of December, 2009.

Russdf Cline, Attorney for Defendant
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the J0_ day of December, 2009,1 caused to be
delivered two copies first class mail, postage pre-paid, the foregoing to:
Thomas W. Seiler
Lori D. Huntington
Robinson, Seiler & Anderson, L.C.
80 North 100 East
P.O. Box 1266
Provo, UT 84603-1266

56

Addendum A - Declaration of Protective Covenants

12087
DECLARATION OF PROTECTIVE COVENANTS
This Declaration of Protective Covenants and Restrictions is
made this 19th day of A p r i l , 1977, by FLYING DIAMOND DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION,
a Utah corporation, hereinafter called "Declarant."
WITNESSES:
WHEREAS, Declarant 1s the owner of the real property described
in Article II hereof (herein called the "Property")
and desires to
create George Osmond Estates, a Subdivision consisting of a residential
area for single family dwellings, streets, sidewalks, medians and other
related facilities for the benefit of a common buildthg scheme (herein
collectively designated as Georqe Osmond Estates); and
WHEREAS, Declarant has deemed 1t necessary and desirable, for
the welfare of the inhabitants of George Osmond Estates and the preservation
of its values, to subject said real property to the covenants, restrictions,
easements, charges, assessments and liens hereinafter set forth, which
covenants, restrictions, easements, charges, assessments and liens shall
be burdens and benefits to Declarant,
its respective successors and
assigns and grantees, and their successors, heirs, executors, administrators, devisees, grantees or assigns; and
WHEREAS, Declarant hereby desires to create certain aqencies
to which should be delegated and assigned the powers and duties of
maintaining and administering the common properties and areas, and
administering
and enforcing the covenants and restrictions and collecting
and disbursing the assessments and charges hereafter created;
NOW THEREFORE, the Declarant declares that the real property
described in Article II hereof is and shall be held, transferred, sold,
occupied, and conveyed subject to the covenants, restrictions, easements,
charges and liens (sometimes referred to as "covenants and restrictions")
hereinafter set forth, sa'id covenants and restrictions being covenants
real which shall run with the land and be considered to be included in
all conveyances, transfers, and leases of any part of said land described
in Article II hereof, whether or not specifically mentioned therein.
ARTICLE I,
Section 1.1 Definitions. The following words when used in
this declaration or m any Supplemental declaration (unless inconsistent
with the context hereof) shall have the followinq meaning:
A. "Board" means the George Osmond Estates Architectural
and Planning Control Board as hereinafter established.
B.
"Builder" means any person at whose direction construction
or reconstruction of a residential house is accomplished,
whether by direct labor and material or through a contractor
or subcontractor.
C. "Council11 means the George Osmond Estates Council, a
Utah non-stock, non-profit membership corporation to be organized
to provide certain facilities and services to the community
and its inhabitants and visitors.
D.
"Common Area" means those portions of the Property
specified on the Plat, including the private road.
E.
"Final Development Plan" means the Final Development
Plan for George Osmond Estates, a Subdivision, as approved by
the City Council of Provo, Utah, on the 22nd day of February
1977, and any supplement or amendment thereto.

,

F. "Parcel" means any lesser included legal description
pf real property which falls within the boundaries of the real
property described 1n Article II hereof including, without
limiting the generality of the foregoing, any building or
otructural component thereof situate upon the Property, but
jhall not include the Common Area.
G. "Plat" means George Osmond Estates, a Subdivision
]ocated in Section 19, Township 6 South, Range 3 East, Utah
County, City of Provo, Utah, as filed for record in the
offices of the Court Recorder of Utah County, Utah, on the
> X _ ^ **
Tiarrti
^"»H- "Owner" means the record owner, whether one or more
persons or entities, of the fee simple title to any Parcel,
fcut shall not m e m or refer to any person or entity who holds
5uch interest merely as security for the performance of a 'debt
0 r other obligation, including a mortgagee or beneficiary
under a deed of trust, unless and until such person has
acquired fee simple title pursuant to foreclosure or other
proceedings.
I. "Utility Lines" means all water and sewer pipelines
gas mains which H e beneath the surface of the ground, all
fire hydrants, and also all electric, telephone, and other
w ire lines, with poles and other necessary appurtenances which
r Un above or below the surface of the ground.
a nd

J. "Board of Managers" means the governing body of the
Council, elected by the members of the Council, to perform the
0pligations of the Council relative to operation, maintenance
a pd management of George Osmond Estates.
ARTICLE II
PROPERTY SUBJECT TO THIS DECLARATION
AND ADDITIONS THERETO
Section 2,1 Existing Property. The real property which i s ,
and shall b0> held, transferred, sold, conveyed, and occupied, subject
to thTs~Decl aration i s H Seated" in ~the~City" of "Provo ,~CoWty~lrFlJtah, and
State of Ut#n» more particularly described in Exhibit A attached hereto
and by this reference made a part hereof, SUBJECT TO the rights-of-way
for ingress a n d e ^ e s s for service and emergency vehicles granted over,
across, o n ^nd through any and all private roads and ways now or hereafter
established o n *he Property as more fully set forth in the Plat and all
streets and easements appearing thereon.
ARTICLE III

ARCHITECTURAL CONTROL
Section 3.1 Board. The George Osmond Estates Architectural
and Planning Control Board shall consist of three members who shall be
designated W tne Board °^ Managers of the Council- The Board shall
review study-> arK* approve o r reject proposed improvements upon the
Property s u W e c t t0 these covenants and restrictions.
Section 3.2. Rules. The Board may make such rules and bylaws as it lf®y deefn appropriate to govern its proceedings.
Section 3.3 Approval of Plan. No building, outbuilding,
fence wall* or other improvements that are not already located on such
property s h ^ De constructed, erected or maintained, nor shall any
additions ther*to, or alteration therein, be made until plans and
specifications showing the design, color, location, materials, landscaping
and such other information relating to such improvement as the Board may
reasonably require shall have been submitted to and approved by the
Board in w H t i n 9 - 2 -

Section 3.4 Schedule of Submissions and Approvals. Each
builder or owner will submit the required plans and specifications to
the Board at least fifteen (15) days before the desired date of approval.
If the design is disapproved, the builder or owner will re-submit plans
and specifications with the required changes. The Board will reserve
the right to require reasonable extension of time and additional information
in order to make decisions on approvals.
Section 3.S Criteria. In passing upon such plans and specifications, the Board shall consider:
A.

professional Services and Documents.

1. Architectural and Engineering Services.
Each Builder or Owner will hire competent architectural
and engineering advisors who will coordinate the des IOTI
and construction documents for the construction of each
structure, addition, change or alteration with the
architect and engineer who are employed as advisors to
the Board. The design and construction documents shall
provide a construction schedule with an estimated date of
completion for each phase of construction.
^*
Documents. Each Builder or Owner will submit
for approval the following documents:
a.
Design documents, which show general
dtspostion of structures, finish materials and
equipment on floor plans and elevations with perspectives as required for explanation. Each set of
design documents will designate the number and area
of each living unit type to be constructed, together
with the Identification of the use to be made of
eaxh room or space included in each living unit
type.
b. Construction documents which show information in drawings and specifications as required for
building permit, efficient communication for construction,
and review of systems and materials quality by the
Declarant.
*** jgnerally. It shall be an objective of the Board to
make certain that no improvements will impair the monetary and
aesthetic values of George Osmond Estates.--The_ Board shall,
consider the suitability of the improvements and the materials
of which they are to be constructed with respect to the particular
area in which they are to be located; the quality of materials
to be utilized in any proposed improvement and the effect of
any proposed improvement on adjacent or neighboring property
and the location and character and method of utilization of
all utility lines.
Section 3.6 Effect of Board's Failure to Act. In the event
the Board fails to approve or disapprove plans and specification documents
submitted to it within thirty (30) days of submission, no extension of
time has been required, and no suit to enjoin the construction has been
commenced prior to the completion thereof, approval shall not be required
and the related covenants shall be determined to have been fully complied
witb^ The Board ska)] not be liable to any person for its actions in
connection with submitted documents, unless it can be shown that they
acted with malice or wrongful intent.
ARTICLE IV
JlEMBERSHIP AND VOTING RIGHTS

IN THE MUNCH"
Section 4.1 Membership. Members of the Council shall be
every Owner of a fee or undivided fee interest in any Parcel subject by
covenants of record to assessment by the Council and every person who
holds a contract purchaser's interest of record in a Parcel. There
shall be no other qualification for membership except as set forth
above. Membership shall terminate on transfer of a fee simple title by
an Owner or the contract purchaser's interest by a contract purchaser
who qualifies as a member. If an Owner sells a Parcel by contract of
sale, upon recordation thereof, the Owner's membership shall terminate
and the contract purchaser's membership shall commence.

Section 4.2 Compliance with Council Articles, By-Laws, etc.
Each Owner shall abide by and benefit from each provision, covenant,
condition and restriction contained in the Articles of Incorporation and
By-Laws of the Council, a copy of which 1s provided to each Owner at the
time of purchase, and by which each Owner agrees to be bound„ or which
is contained 1n any rule, regulation, or restriction promulgated pursuant
to said Articles and By-Laws. The obligations, burdens, and benefits of
membership in the Council, to the extent that they touch and concern the
land, shall be covenants running with each Owner's Parcel for the
benefit of all other Parcels and the Common Area.
Section 4.3 Voting Rights. The voting rights of the members
shall be as specified in the Articles of Incorporation.
ARTICLE V
RIGHTS IN THE COMMON AREA
Section 5.1 Members' Licenses of Enjoyment. Every member of
the Council shall have an irrevocable license to enjoy the Common Area.
Access to the private road may be controlled by a lockable gate, provided
that said gate must meet all requirements of the City of Provo and other
governmental agencies.
Section 5.2 Title to Common Area. The Declarant, its successors
and assigns shall retain the legal title to the Common Area until such
time as it has completed improvements thereon and until such time as, in
the opinion of the Declarant, the Council is able to maintain the same,
but notwithstanding any provisions herein, the Declarant hereby covenants,
for itself, its heirs and assigns, that it shall convey the Common Area
to the Council not later than October 1, 1978,
Section 5.3 Right to Transfer. The right of the Council to
dedicate or transfer all or any part of the Common Area to any public
agency, authority, or utility for such purposes and subject to such
conditions as may be agreed to by the members, provided that no such
dedication or transfer, determination as to the purposes or as to the
conditions thereof, shall be effective unless an instrument signed by
members entitled to cast two-thirds (2/3) of the votes has been recorded,
agreeing to such dedication, transfer, purpose or condition, and unless
written notice of the proposed agreement and action thereunder is sent"
to every member at least thirty (30) days in advance of any action
taken.
ARTICLE VI
COVENANT FOR MAINTENANCE ASSESSMENTS
Section 6.1 Creation of the Lien and Personal Obligation of
Assessments. Each Owner of any Parcel by acceptance of a deed therefor,
whether or not it shall be so expressed in any such deed or other conveyance,
agrees to pay to the Council: (1) annual assessments or charges as
provided herein; and (2) special assessments for capital improvements,
such assessments to be fixed, established, and collected from time to
time as hereinafter provided. The annual and special assessments,
together with such interest thereon and costs of collection thereof diS
hereinafter provided, shall be a charge on the land and shall be a
continuing lien upon the property against which each such assessment is
made until paid. Each „uch assessment, together with such interest
thereon and cost of collection thereof as hereinafter provided, shall
also be the personal obligation of the person who was the Owner of such
Parcel at the time when the assessment fell due.
Section 6.2 Purpose of Assessments. The assessments levied
by the Council shall be used for the purpose of promoting the health,
safety, and welfare of the residents of George Osmond Estates and in
particular for the improvement and maintenance of the Property, the
services, and facilities devoted to this purpose and the Common Area,
including but not limited to, the payment of taxes and insurance thereon
and general maintenance, repair, replacement, and additions thereto, the

cost of labor, equipment, materials, management, and supervision thereof.
No assessments or fees hereunder shall be used for capital Improvements
or expenditures unless approved by a vote of two-thirds of the membership
of the Council and mortgagees.
Section 6.3 Assessments. Annual assessments shall begin 1n
the year beginning January 1, 1978. Unless changed by vote of the
membership, the maximum annual assessment for any Parcel shall be $200.00
per year. The Board of Managers of the Council may, after consideration
of the current maintenance costs and the financial requirements of the
Council, fix the actual assessment at an amount less than the maximum.
The maximum annual assessment may be charged as follows:
A.
From and after January 1, 1978, the maximum annual
assessment may be Increased each year not more than 10% above
the maximum assesment for the previous year without a vote of
the membership.
fi. From and after January 1, 1978, the maximum annual
assessment may be increased above 10% by a vote of one-half
(1/2) of the members who are voting in person or by proxy, at
a meeting duly called for this purpose.
C. The Board of Managers may fix the annual assessment
at an amount nrt in excess of the maximum.
Written notice of any meeting of members called to change the
maximum annual assessment shall be sent to all members at least thirty
(30) days in advance of the date of such meeting, setting forth the
purposes of the meeting.
Section 6.4 Special Assessments for Capital Improvements.
In addition to the annual assessments authorized by Section 6.3 hereof,
the Board of Managers of the Council may levy a special assessment for
the purpose of defraying, in whole or in part, the cost of any construction
or reconstruction, unexpected repair or replacement of any capital
improvements upon the Common Area, including the necessary fixtures and
personal property related thereto, provided that any such assessment
shall have the assent of two-thirds (2/3) of the votes of the Council
who are voting in person or by proxy at a meeting duly called for this
purpose, written notice of which shalj be sent to all members at least
thirty (30) days in advance and shall set forth the purpose of the
meeting.
Section 6.5 Quorum. A quorum for any action authorized under
5ections 6.3 and 6.4 hereof shall be as follows:
At the first meeting called, as provided in Sections 6.3 and
6.4 hereof, the presence at the meeting of members, or of
proxies entitled to cast sixty percent (60%) of all votes of
the Council shall constitute a quorum. If the required quorum
is not forthcoming at any meeting, another meeting may be
called, subject to the notice requirements set forth in Sections
6.3 and 6.4 and the required quorum at any such subsequent
meeting shall be one-half of the required quorum at the
preceding meeting, provided that no such subsequent meeting
shall be held more than sixty (60) days following the preceding
meeting.
Section 6.6 Payment of Annual Assessments: Due Dates. The
annual assessments provided for herein shall be payable in semi-annual
installments (1/2 of the annual assessment) on the first day of each
January and July of each year. The due date of any special assessments
under Section 6.4 hereof shall be fixed in the resolution authorizing
such assessment.
Section 6.1 Duties of the Council. The Council shall, at
least ten (10) days in advance of the assessment date or period, prepare
a roster of the properties and assessments applicable thereto which
shall be kept in the office of the Council and shall be open to inspection

by any Owner, and shall at that time, fix the amount of the assessment
in accordance with this Declaration against each Parcel for each assessment
period.
Written notice of the assessment shall thereupon be sent
to e^ery Owner and mortgagee or prospective mortgagee subject thereto.
A list of mortgagees to whom notices are to be sent,
shall be maintained by the Council and changes therein shall be the
responsiblity of the Owners.
The Council shall, upon demand at any time furnish to any
Owner and mortgagee, or prospective Owner or mortgagee liable for said
assessment, a certificate in writing signed by an officer of the Council,
setting forth whether said assessment has been paid. Such certificate
shall be conclusive evidence of payment of any assessment therein stated
to have been paid.
Section 6.8 Effect of Non-Payment of Assessment: The Personal
Obligation of the QwnerT The Lien; Remedies of Declarant." If the assessments
are not paid on the date when due (being the dates specified in Section
6.6 hereof), then such assessment shall become delinquent and shall,
together with such interest thereon and cost of collection thereof as
hereinafter provided, thereupon become a continuing lien on the property
which shall bind such property in the hands of the then Owner, his
heirs, devisees, personal respresentatives and assign*. The personal
obligation of the then Owner to pay such assessment shall in addition
remain his personal obligation until such assessment is paid or the
statutory period runs, whichever is shorter.
If the assessment is not paid within thirty (30) days
after the delinquency date, the assessment shall bear interest from the
date of delinquency at the rate of ten percent (102) per annum, and the
Council may bring an action against the party personally obligated to
pay the same and/or foreclose the lien against the property, and there
shall be added to the amount of such assessment the costs of preparing
and filing the complaint in such action, and in the event a judgment is
obtained, such judgment shall include interest on the assessment as
above provided and reasonable attorney's fees to be fixed by the court
together with all other costs of the action.
Section 6.9 Subordination of the Lien to Mortgages. The lien
of the assessments provided herein shall be subordinate to the lien of
any first mortgage or deed of trust now or hereafter placed upon the
Property or any Parcel or portion thereof subject to assessment. Sale
or transfer of such property pursuant to a decree of foreclosure or by a
public trustee's foreclosure, or any other proceeding or deed in lieu of
foreclosure, shall relieve such property from assessments previously
levied, but shall not relieve such property from liability for any
assessments assessed after such acquisition of title, nor from the lien
of any such subsequent assessment.
Section 6.10 Exempt Property. The following property subject
to this Declaration shall be exempted from the assessments, charge and
lien created herein.
A.
All properties to the extent of any easement or
other interest therein dedicated and accepted by the local
public authority and devoted to public use;
B.

The Common Area;

c.
All properties exempted from taxation by the laws of
the State of Utah, upon the terms and to the extent of such
legal exemption.
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Section 6.11 Exterior Haintenance. In addition to maintenance
upon the Common Area, the Council may provide exterior maintenance upon
each Parcel which is subject to assessment under this Article VI hereof,
as follows: paint, repair, replace and care for roofs, gutters, downspouts,
exterior building surfaces, trees, shrubs, grass walks, and other exterior
improvements.
Section 6.12 Assessment of Cost. The cost of such exterior
maintenance shall be assessed against the Parcel upon which such maintenance
is done and shall be added to and become a part of the annual assessment
or charge or charges to which such Parcel is subject under this Article
VI hereof and, as part of such assessment or charge, it shall be a lien
against the Parcel and obligation of the Owner or Owners thereof and
shall become due and payable in all respects as provided in this Article VI
hereof.
Section 6.13 Access at Reasonable Hours. For the purpose
solely of performing the maintenance required by this krticle^
the
Council, through its duly authorized agents or employees shall have the
right, after reasonable notice to the Owner, to enter upon any Parcel at
reasonable hours, provided that in the case of emergencies the Council,
through its authorized agents or employees, may enter upon the Parcel at
any time.
ARTICLE VII
PROTECTIVE COVENANTS
Section 7.1 Improvements Prohibited. No used or secondhand
structure, no building of a temporary character, no mobile home, house
trailer, tent, shack or outbuilding shall be placed or used on the
Property, either temporarily or permanently; except that necessary
appurtenances for and during actual construction may be used and trailers
and structures of a temporary nature may be used during the period of
permanent construction of an approved and allowed improvement, but no
longer period than 12 months without the written consent of the Board.
Section 7,2 Siqns. No signs, billboards, posterbo^rds or
advertising structure of any kind shall be erected or maintained for any
purpose_whatsoever_except such signs as have been approved by the Board
as reasonably necessary foF identification "of residences~and places~of"
business. Any signs which are permitted under the foregoing restrictions
shall be erected or maintained on the Properties only with the prior
written approval of the Board which approval shall be given only if such
signs shall be of attractive design and shall be as small a size as
reasonably possible and shall be placed or located as directed or
approved by the Board.
Section 7.3 Water and Sewage. Each structure designed for
occupancy or use by human beings shall connect with the water and sewage
facilities of the City of Provo or such water and/or sewer systems as
the Board may approve. No private well shall be used as a source of
water for human consumption or irrigation, nor shall any facility other
than those provided as set out above be used for disposal of sewage.
Section 7,4 Trash and Sewage. No trash, ashes or other
refuse or debris may be thrown or dumped on the Property. The burning
of refuse out-of-doors shall not be permitted. No Incinerators or other
device for the burning of refuse indoors shall be constructed, installed
or used by any person except as approved by the Board. Waste materials,
garbage and trash shall be kept 1n sanitary containers and shall be
enclosed and screened from public view and protected from disturbance
and shall be disposed of with reasonable promptness.
Section 7.5 Livestock. Dogs, cats or other customary household
pets may be kept on the Property, not to exceed two per Parcel without
the written approval of the Board of Managers. However, no pet may be
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kept which abnormally Interferes with the rights, comforts or convenience
of other Owners. Breeding of any animals on the Property is specifically
prohibited. All pets must be kept on a leash when outside its Owner's
Parcel.
Section 7.6 Setback Requirements. The location of each
improvement with relation to property lines must be within the buildable
area established for 1t on the Final Development Plan and the Plat. The
location of each improvement within the buildable area must also be
approved in advance by the Board. In determining the proper location
for each improvement, the Board shall consider the location of existing
and future Improvements on adjacent property, and such other monetary or
aesthetic consideration as it may deem necessary.
Section 7.7 Landscaping and Gardening. All surface areas
disturbed by construction shall be returned promptly to their natural
condition.
Section 7.8 Trade Names. No word, name, symbol or combination
thereof shall be used to identify for commercial purposes a structure,
business or service, unless the same shall have been first approved in
writing by the Board.
Section 7.9 Continuity of Construction. All structures
commenced shall be prosecuted diligently to completion.
Section 7.10 Noxious or Offensive Activity. No noxious or
offensive activity shall be carried on upon any Parcel nor shall anything
be done or placed on the Property which is or may become a nuisance or
cause embarrassment, disturbance or annoyance to others.
Section 7.11 Maintenance of Property. Every Parcel, including
improvements, shall be kept and maintained by the Owner thereof in a
clean, safe, attractive and sightly condition, and in good repair; no
inoperative private automobile shall be placed or remain on any Parcel
or adjacent street for more than 48 hours; no commercial type vehicles
and no trucks shall be stored or parked on any Parcel or residential
street except while engaged in transportation; trailers, mobile homes,
trucks, boats, tractors, campers not on a truck, vans of any kind,
buses, snow removal equipment and garden o»" maintenance equipment shall
be kept at all times, except when in actual use, in a closed structure
or screened from view; service areas, storage piles, facilities for
hanging, drying or airing clothing Tor household fabrics shall~be~appropriately
screened from view, and no lumber, grass, shrub or tree clippings or
plant waste, metals, bulk materials, scrap, refuse or trash shall be
kept, stored or allowed to accumulate on any Parcel.
Section 7.12 Annoying Lights, Sounds or Odors. Mo lights
shall be emitted from any property which are unreasonably bright or
cause unreasonable glare; no sound shall be emitted from any Parcel
which is unreasonably loud or annoying; and no odor shall be emitted
from any Parcel which is noxious or offensive to others.
Section 7.13 Fences. No fences, walls or other barriers
shall be permitted except with the written consent of the Board.
Section 7.14 Subdivision. No Owner shall further subdivide
any Parcel of the Property after the same has been platted, and the plat
approved as required by the City of Provo, Utah, without the consent of
the Board in writing and proper presentation to and acquiescence by the
City of Provo.
ARTICLE VIII
GENERAL PROVISIONS
Section 8.1 Duration. The covenants and restrictions of this
Declaration shall run with and bind the land and shall inure to the
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benefit of and be binding upon the Owner of any Parcel and subject to
this Declaration, their respective legal representatives, heirs, successors,
and assigns, for a period of twenty-five (25) years from the date this
Declaration is recorded, after which time said covenants shall be automatica
extended for successive periods of ten (10) years unless an Instrument
signed by the then Owners of two-thirds (2/3) of the Parcels and all of
the mortgagees thereof has been recorded, agreeing to change said covenants
and restrictions in whole or in part. Provided, however, that no such
agreement to change shall be effective unless written notice of the
proposed agreement is sent to every Owner at least thirty (30) days in
advance of any action taken.
Section 8.2 Notices. Any notice required to be sent to any
member. Owner or mortaaaee under the provisions of this Declaration
shall be deemed to have been properly sent when mailed, postpaid, to the
last known address of the person who appears a member, Owner or mortgagee
on the records of the Council at the time of such mailing.
Section 8.3 Easements. Declarant hereby reserves to Itself
its successors and assigns, perpetual easements under, over, and across
the Common Area and under, over, and across each Parcel specified on the
Plat for the purpose of constructing, maintaining and operating sewers
and drainage systems^ conduits for lightig, heating, power, telephone,
and other methods of conducting and performing any public or quasipublic utility service or function. Within such easements, the following
restrictions shall apply:
A.
No building, structure, tree, or other object shall
be built upon or be permitted to encroach upon the utility
line itself or within five (5) feet of either side of the
centerline of such a line without the written permission of
the Board, and Declarant reserves the right to remove all such
buildings, structures, or objects from any such area, when
installed without permission of the Board. Where the board
grants such permissions, and it subsequently becomes necessary
to disturb, injure or remove the same in the utilization of
the easement for the purpose for which it is reserved, removal
shall be accomplished at the expense of the Owner, and neither
the Declarant, the Council, nor the Board, nor any utility
company utilizing the easement with the consent of the Board
shall be responsible to the Owner for injury or damages to
such structures, trees, or other planting or object.
B.
Access to the easements shall always be available to
the Declarant, the Council or to public utilities with the
consent of the Board seeking to install, maintain, and repair
utility lines and facilities of all sorts, whether or not it
is necessary for the purposes of such access, installation,
maintenance, and repair to enter upon any other property not
designated as utility line areas, the use of such easements to
be generally for the good of all Parcel Owners in the maintenance
of lines, facilities, and services.
Section 8.4 Enforcement of Covenants and Restrictions. If
any person, firm or corporation shall violate or threaten to violate any
of the provisions of this instrument, it shall be lawful for the Declarant,
the Council or the Board or for any person, firm or corporation owning
land included xithin this Declaration, to Institute proceedings at law
or in equity to enforce the provisions of this instrument, to restrain
the person, firm or corporation violating or threatening to violate them
and to recover damages, actual and punitive, together with reasonable
attorneys' fees, for such violations or threatened violations- No
failure on the part of any such person, firm or corporation or Declarant
to enforce any covenant immediately after any such cause may arise shall
be deemed a waiver as to that cause or of any similar cause that may
thereafter arise.
Section 8.5 Declarant's Rights Assignable. All of the rights
of the Declarant herein reserved, including rights reserved to enforce
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any and all of the covenants and reservations shall be freely assignable
and any assignee shall succeed to all of the rights of any assignee
thereof.
Section 8.6 Disclaimer of Creation of Private Property Rights
by Certain Unrecorded Public Documents. The Declarant has submitted to
2oning and planning authorities of the City of Provo, Utah, the Final
Development Plan for the future development of George Osmond Estates, in
order to fulfill the requirements of the City ordinances relating to
zoning and subdivisions control. Said Plan is on file with the City
Clerk- The Declarant may be required to make additional submissions of
plans to the City authorities. All such plans are part of the public
controls imposed by the City upon the Declarant, Owners, residents and
users of George Osmond Estates, and they do not create, and are not
intended to create any private property or contract rights in the Owners
and residents of George Osmond Estates. The plans which the Declarant
has submitted to the City represents a plan of development which the
Declarant believes will provide maximum benefits to the residents,
Owners and the public. During the development program, however, various
factors can intervene which may hinder the effectiveness of such longrange plans and which may threaten the benefits to be derived by the
residents. Owners and the public unless such plans can be modified as
prescribed by the applicable City ordinances. Accordingly, this Declaration
is not intended to nor does grant or create any private property or
contract rights under any of the above described plans and such plans
continue to remain subject to modification by the proper City authorities
in accordance with the procedures set forth in the ordinances of the
City.
Section 8.7 Amendment. This Declaration may be amended by an
instrument signed by ct least eighty percent (805.) of the Parcel owners
of record and the holders of mortgages or deeds of trust of at least
eighty percent (80%) of the Parcels. No such amendment shall be effective
unless written notice of the amendment is sent to every Owner and mortgagee
appearing in the records of the Declarant at least thirty (30) days in
advance of any action taken. No such amendment shall be effective
unless recorded in the office of the County Recorder of Utah County,
Utah.
Section 8.8 Severability. Invalidation of any one of these
covenants or restrictions by judgment or court order shall in no wise
affect any other provisions which shall remain in full force and effect.
Section 8.9 ~Compliance CertificateT~~At~the request of any
Owner or Builder, the Council will certify to any interested lender
whether or not any default exists hereunder and the amount of any unpaid
assessments, which certification shall be binding on said Council.
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, Flying Diamond Development Corporation has
caused this instrument to be executed as of the date first above appearing.
FLYING DIAMOND DEVELOPMENT CORPO
Attest:

\y
,7s

/

.
A s s i s t a n t Secretary

H. K McLish, J/ice/ Prfes'ideTi

STATE OF COLORADO

)
) ss.
C i t y and County o f Denver)
The foregoing instrument was acknowledged before me t h i s | Q day of Q , j ^ £
1977, by H. P. McLish as Vice President and John F.
Jennings a F A s s i s t a n t Secretary o f F l y i n g Diamond Development C o r p o r a t i o n ,
a Utah c o r p o r a t i o n .

^

cx^*^lt T N E S S

my hand and off1cial seal

A^.-'^^^orm.5s.on

-

exDires

•

My Commission expires March 5, 1978

+ • ^ ' B L \ ° A . /

Notary Public

- 10 -

^

^EXHIBIT A
TO DECLARATION OF* PROTECTIVE COVENANTS
DATED ;ARflIL 19^1377

Conrnendngl at a poIntoWhilch'Is'lNonth 487^46/ feet.and West 1,210.74 f e e t
from the.Northeast, Corner of Section ,15,r,Township 6.South, tRange 3 East,
Salt Lake £ase andtMeridian; thenceJ Souths0°40142" West '35.2V f e e t ;
thence North .83°23l West 78.67 f e e t ^ t h e n c e Hoigth 39?05Mtest*21.40
f e e t ; thenpe South«18°11''West'115.T4 feet;rttience North<85 0 23 4 45 u West
28.84 f e e t ; thence:South 31 0 24' West 314.70;feet; thence South 63°35'
West 151.62 f e e t ; thence South 41°39< West 336.00 f e e t ; thence South
S&3Q1 West 121.30 f e e t ; thence North 66r30'tWest 81.70 f e e t ; thence
North i r 3 f West 8 1 . 6 a f e e t ; thence Nonth 8°5V West 186.47 f e e t ;
thence Souj:h 89°52' West 158.49 f e e t ; thence North 197.35 f e e t ; thence
South 89 0 22' West 86.88 f e e t ; thence North 53°22* East 483.85 f e e t ;
thence North 34°00 l 16" East 217.91 f e e t ; thence North 77°00 , 19 M East
133.42 f e e t ; thence South 84°05 , 38" East 145.77 f e e t , thence North
14°00 4 47 H East 144.33 f e e t ; Thence South 55 0 00'29 H East 183.16 f e e t ;
thence South 63 00' East 50.00 f e e t ; thence along the arc of a 656.38
foot radius curve to the r i g h t 22.83 f e e t , the chord of which bears
South 27°59 l 48" West 22.83 f e e t ; thence South 44°00' East 251.54 f e e t to
the point of beginning.

L-f F

J=3~

*0

^

o
^1
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Addendum B - Picture of Raven
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Addendum C - December 3, 2002 letter from Landrith to the
Association

George (Lanny) Landrith, Jr.
892 Osmond Lane
Provo, UT 84604—5229
(801) 221—1637
Paul Stanworth,
President,
Osmond Lane Homeowners Association

Tuesday, December 03, 2002

Enclosed are two items:

.*f!JI3M

S> O

1) First Virginia Bank check 1024, dated December 3,2002,

^

3^o

2) a copy of the Osmond Lane Homeowners' Association invoice #
dated / / ~ 3 . y - g ) 3 „ f b r / / , ; / 3 ,
_, which the enclosed check pays for.
I make this payment despite my belief that I owe none of it. Thus, my payment of this
invoice is NOT any agreement on my part of the legitimacy of the enclosed invoice.
Also - except for the yearly dues owed — the enclosed check constitutes full payment of
any money owed by me to Osmond Lane Homeowners' Association - especially any
money owed for expenditures to lawyers. Your depositing the enclosed check
acknowledges the payment as being full payment of any money owed by me to the
Association except for the yearly dues.

^y, ^Ll^yfGeorge (Lanny) Landrith, Jr.

Received by:
(date)
Witnessed by:
(date)
Witnessed by:_
(date)

**•»"

^ ^ ^

516

Addendum D - Copy of Rule 702 of the Utah Rules of
Evidence

Rule 7 0 2 . Testimony by experts.
(a) Subject to the limitations in subsection (b), if scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge will assist the trier of
fact to understand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue, a witness qualified as an expert by knowledge, skill,
experience, training, or education may testify thereto in the form of an opinion or otherwise.
(b) Scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge may serve as the basis for expert testimony if the scientific,
technical, or other principles or methods underlying the testimony meet a threshold showing that they (i) are reliable, (11)
are based upon sufficient facts or data, and (HI) have been reliably applied to the facts of the case.
(c) The threshold showing required by subparagraph (b) is satisfied if the principles or methods on which such knowledge is
based, including the sufficiency of facts or data and the manner of their application to the facts of the case, are generally
accepted by the relevant expert community.
Advisory Committee Note.
Apart from its introductory clause, part (a) of the amended Rule recites verbatim Federal Rule 702 as it appeared before it
was amended in 2000 to respond to Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 509 U.S. 579 (1993). The 2007
amendment to the Rule added that introductory clause, along with parts (b) and (c). Unlike its predecessor, the amended
rule does not incorporate the text of the Federal Rule. Although Utah law foreshadowed in many respects the developments
in federal law that commenced with Daubert, the 2007 amendment preserves and clarifies differences between the Utah and
federal approaches to expert testimony.
The amended rule embodies several general considerations. First, the rule is intended to be applied to all expert testimony.
In this respect, the rule follows federal law as announced in Kumho Tire Co. v. Carmichael, 526 U.S. 137 (1999). Next, like
its federal counterpart, Utah's rule assigns to trial judges a '"gatekeeper" responsibility to screen out unreliable expert
testimony. In performing their gatekeeper function, trial judges should confront proposed expert testimony with rational
skepticism. This degree of scrutiny is not so rigorous as to be satisfied only by scientific or other specialized principles or
methods that are free of controversy or that meet any fixed set of criteria fashioned to test reliability. The rational skeptic is
receptive to any plausible evidence that may bear on reliability. She is mindful that several principles, methods or
techniques may be suitably reliable to merit admission into evidence for consideration by the trier of fact. The fields of
knowledge which may be drawn upon are not limited merely to the "scientific" and "technical", but extend to all "specialized"
knowledge. Similarly, the expert is viewed, not in a narrow sense, but as a person qualified by "knowledge, skill, experience,
training or education". Finally, the gatekeeping trial judge must take care to direct her skepticism to the particular
proposition that the expert testimony is offered to support. The Daubert court characterized this task as focusing on the
"work at hand". The practitioner should equally take care that the proffered expert testimony reliably addresses the "work at
hand", and that the foundation of reliability presented for it reflects that consideration.
Section (c) retains limited features of the traditional Frye test for expert testimony. Generally accepted principles and
methods may be admitted based on judicial notice. The nature of the "work at hand" is especially important here. It might
be important in some cases for an expert to educate the factfinder about general principles, without attempting to apply
these principles to the specific facts of the case. The rule recognizes that an expert on the stand may give a dissertation or
exposition of principles relevant to the case, leaving the trier of fact to apply them to the facts. Proposed expert testimony
that seeks to set out relevant principles, methods or techniques without offering an opinion about how they should be
applied to a particular array of facts will be, in most instances, more eligible for admission under section (c) than case
specific opinion testimony. There are, however, scientific or specialized methods or techniques applied at a level of
considerable operational detail that have acquired sufficient general acceptance to merit admission under section (c).
The concept of general acceptance as used in section (c) is intended to replace the novel vs. non-novel dichotomy that has
served as a central analytical tool in Utah's Rule 702 jurisprudence. The failure to show general acceptance meriting
admission under section (c) does not mean the evidence is inadmissible, only that the threshold showing for reliability under
section (b) must be shown by other means.
Section (b) adopts the three general categories of inquiry for expert testimony contained in the federal rule. Unlike the
federal rule, however, the Utah rule notes that the proponent of the testimony is required to make only a "threshold"
showing. That "threshold" requires only a basic foundational showing of indicia of reliability for the testimony to be
admissible, not that the opinion is indisputably correct. When a trial court, applying this amendment, rules that an expert's
testimony is reliable, this does not necessarily mean that contradictory expert testimony is unreliable. The amendment is
broad enough to permit testimony that is the product of competing principles or methods in the same field of expertise.
Contrary and inconsistent opinions may simultaneously meet the threshold; it is for the factfinder to reconcile - or choose
between - the different opinions. As such, this amendment is not intended to provide an excuse for an automatic challenge
to the testimony of every expert, and it is not contemplated that evidentiary hearings will be routinely required in order for
the trial judge to fulfill his role as a rationally skeptical gatekeeper. In the typical case, admissibility under the rule may be
determined based on affidavits, expert reports prepared pursuant to Utah R.Civ.P. 26, deposition testimony and memoranda
of counsel.

Addendum E - Ruling, entered January 18, 2007
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IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
UTAH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

OSMOND LANE HOMEOWNERS
ASSOCIATION, an unincorporated
association,
Plaintiff,
vs.

1 CASE NUMBER: 060400414
DATED: JANUARY 18,2007
RULING
ANTHONY W. SCHOFIELD, JUDGE

GEORGE C. LANDRITH, JR.,
Defendant.

This matter comes before the court on Defendant George Landrith Jr.'s ("Landrith")
motion for summary judgment. Having reviewed the file and being fully advised, I deny the
motion.
I. BACKGROUND
This case was brought by the Osmond Land Homeowners Association (the "HOA"), who
filed a complaint to enforce a lien assessed against real property owned by Landrith and located
at 892 Osmond Lane, Provo, Utah. In autumn of 2005, the HOA incurred costs in causing
certain work to be performed on Landrith's property, allegedly to cure safety issues that arose
due to soil erosion. The HOA assessed those amounts against Landrith's property, and Landrith
refused to pay. The HOA subsequently filed a Notice of Lien on January 13, 2006 for the unpaid
1
•»—

^
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amounts. Landrith moved for judgment as a matter of law, asserting that the HOA lacked the
authority to assess fees or assert liens under the Declaration of Protective Covenants (the
"Declaration") to which Landrith's property is subject.
In making this motion, Landrith concedes that his property is subject to the covenants in
the Declaration and has not disputed that his property is generally subject to assessments for
exterior maintenance. Landrith's sole contention is based on the argument that the Declaration
grants authority to make such assessments not to the HOA, but to the George Osmond Estates
Council. Citing a separate action between Landrith and the HOA that was decided in favor of
the HOA in 2002, the HOA first counters that Landrith's argument is barred by the doctrine of
issue preclusion. The HOA further claims that although it lacks authority to impose assessments
under the Declaration, its authority has been ratified by the homeowners. Finally, the HOA
asserts that it also has authority to impose assessments as a collective body of individual
homeowners.
II. ANALYSIS
A.

Issue Preclusion Does Not Bar Landrith's Challenge to the HOA's Authority.
I will begin by addressing the HOA's claim that Landrith's argument is barred by issue

preclusion. In Utah, issue preclusion bars parties from relitigating issues where:
[1] [T]he party against whom issue preclusion is asserted must have been a party to
or in privity with a party to the prior adjudication; [2] the issue decided in the prior
adjudication must be identical to the one presented in the instant action; [3] the issue
in the first action must have been completely, fully, and fairly litigated; and [4] the
first suit must have resulted in a final judgment on the merits.
Brigham Young Univ. v. Tremco Consultants, Inc., 2005 UT 18, f 27, 110 P.3d 678 (quoting
Murdoch v. Springville Mun. Corp., 1999 UT 39, \ 15, 982 P.2d 65). It is undisputed that the

2

parties are identical and that the prior action resulted in a final judgment on the merits.
However, as Landrith correctly points out, the second and third requirements of issue preclusion
are not met here.
First, the issue as to whether the HOA can make assessments pursuant to authority the
Declaration granted to the George Osmond Estates Council is not identical to any issue litigated
in the prior action. It is undisputed that Landrith's challenge to the HOA's authority in the prior
action was based on the argument, which appeared on Landrith's Request for Hearing, that "the
member of the Homeowners Association did not have the Association's authorization to
Accumulate the Legal Fees." It is also undisputed that Landrith presently challenges the HOA's
authority to impose assessments and liens because the declaration vests that authority in the
George Osmond Estates Council. Any loose and distant relationship these issues may have to
one another is insufficient to create an identity of issues. See Zufelt v. Haste, Inc., 2006 UT App
326, ^[ 10-14, 142 P.3d 594 (holding that a bankruptcy court's determination of an individual's
ownership interest in a corporation was not identical to the issue of the individual's ownership
interest for the purposes of determining whether the individual had standing to defend the
corporation in a separate action).
Even if the issues were identical, there can be no issue preclusion where there has not
been "a full and fair opportunity to litigate the issue." Id. at \ 15, 142 P.3d 594. Landrith's
challenge to the HOA member's authority to "accumulate . . . legal fees" was not even briefed in
the prior action, and it is undisputed that Landrith's opportunity to address the issue in the oral
hearing was limited. As in Zufelt^ "[t]he issue [in the present case] was not the central issue in
the [prior] case, and was only superficially addressed." Id. Therefore, the issue preclusion

3
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argument fails on two counts and does not bar Landrith's challenge to the HOA's authority.
B.

The HOA Has Authority to Impose Assessments on Landrith's Property.
Based on the equitable powers of this court, I find unpersuasive Landrith's argument that

the HOA lacks authority to impose assessments pursuant to the terms of the Declaration. This
case falls squarely within the doctrine articulated by the Utah Supreme Court in Swan Creek
Village Homeowners Ass 'n v. Warne, 2006 UT 22, 134 P.3d 1122. In Swan Creek, a new
homeowners association was incorporated after the original association was involuntarily
dissolved for failing to file its annual report or pay the filing fee. Despite the fact that the new
association was not authorized by the governing declaration, which recognized only the original
association, the court held that the new association had the authority to impose assessments on
lot owners.
In holding that the homeowners association had authority to levy assessments, the court
stated unambiguously that "[w]here property owners have treated an association as one with
authority to govern and impose assessments contemplated under the terms of a duly recorded
governing declaration, they ratify its authority to act." Id. at ^f 32. In so holding, the court
emphasized that the homeowners association had been operating under the terms of the
declaration for nearly twenty years, that the association's authority had been recognized by the
lot owners during that time, that the lot owners had been paying dues to the association, that the
association had undertaken property management duties, that no competing association had
emerged, that the HOA's articles of incorporation and the Declaration were on file years before
Warne had purchased the lot, and that a court in a prior action had held that the association had
the power to collect assessments.

4

disputed that the Osmond Estates owners have treated the HOA as an association "with authority
to govern and impose assessments contemplated under the terms of [the Declaration]." Id. It is
also undisputed that the lot owners, including Landrith, have paid dues to the HOA and have
otherwise recognized the HOA's authority. The HOA submitted affidavit evidence that Landrith
has repeatedly paid the HOA annual fees, special fees, and assessments for prior repairs and
maintenance. Landrith has not submitted any evidence to the contrary. Furthermore, it is
undisputed that the HOA has been operating pursuant to the terms of the Declaration for nearly
twenty-eight years, that the association has undertaken property management duties, that no
competing association has emerged, that the Declaration was recorded prior to Landrith's
acquiring property in George Osmond Estates, and that the HOA's authority to levy assessments
was upheld in a prior action.
Landrith attempts to distinguish Swan Creek, but the differences cited are immaterial.
Landrith essentially focuses on the fact that in Swan Creek, the new homeowners association was
the same type of entity and bore the same name as the original association that had been
dissolved. And in the present case, the Declaration grants authority to a corporation operating
under the name "George Osmond Estates Council," whereas the HOA is an unincorporated
association d.b.a. Osmond Lane Homeowners Association. The cited difference, however, is
without consequence. The Swan Creek case was not decided based on the official name of the
homeowners association or what type of entity it happened to be. The court explicitly articulated
the important factors in its decision, and the association's name and type of entity were not
among them. Landrith has failed to cite any meaningful distinction in the present case.
Therefore, I find Landrith's argument to be unpersuasive and deny his motion.
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Therefore, I find Landrith's argument to be unpersuasive and deny his motion.
Because I am denying Landrith's motion based on the law articulated in Swan Creek, it is
unnecessary to address the HOA's argument that it possesses the authority to levy assessments as
a collective body of individual lot owners. However, I will briefly address why this argument is
unlikely to prevail. The only power that the Declaration grants to individual lot owners is "to
institute proceedings at law or in equity." The authority to levy assessments cannot fit within
any reasonable interpretation of this provision. The individual lot owners therefore had no such
authority to collectively exercise through the HOA. As stated by the Supreme Court of
Colorado, "an agent can have no greater power than its principal." Romer v. Bd. of County
Com'rs, 956 P.2d 566, 581 (Colo. 1998).
III. CONCLUSION
I deny Defendant Landrith's motion for judgment as a matter of law. I find that
Landrith's argument is not barred by issue preclusion, but is nevertheless unpersuasive.
Additionally, there is no cross motion for summary judgment from the HOA properly before this
court and, as such, I am addressing Landrith's motion for summary judgment only.
Pursuant to Rule 7(f)(2), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, the HOA's counsel is directed to
prepare an appropriate order.
Dated this \^_ day of January, 2007.

MAILING CERTIFICATE
I hereby certify that a4rue and correct copy of the foregoing was mailed to the
following, postage prepaid, this \0 day of January, 2007:
Thomas W. Seiler
Lori D. Huntington
ROBINSON, SEILER & ANDERSON, LC
Attorneys for Plaintiff
80 North 100 East
P.O. Box 1266
Provo, Utah 84603-1266
Russell A. Cline
CRIPPEN & CLINE, LC
Attorneys for Defendant
10 West 100 South, Suite 425
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101
LORI WOFFINDEN
CLERK OF THE COURT
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Addendum F - Order Granting Plaintiffs Motion for
Summary Judgment, entered May 31, 2007

FILED

r

MAY 3 1 2001
4*mojsracT
STATE OF UTAH

Thomas W. Seiler #2910
Lori D. Huntington #6252
ROBINSON, SEILER & ANDERSON, LC
Attorneys for the Plaintiff
2500 North University Ave.
P.O. Box 1266
Provo, UT 84604
Telephone: (801) 375-1920
Facsimile: (801) 377-9405

\xm\ COUNTY

IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
UTAH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

OSMOND LANE HOMEOWNERS
ASSOCIATION, an unincorporated
association,

ORDER GRANTING PLAINTIFF'S
MOTION FOR SUMMARY .JUDGMENT

Plaintiff,
vs.

Case No.: 060400414

GEORGE C. LANDRITH JR.

Division: 8; Judge: Schofield

Defendant.

The above-entitled matter came on regularly for hearing before the above-entitled Court,
the Honorable Anthony WriSchofietd7©istricl Court Judge, presiding, on April 26, 2007.
Thomas W. Seiler and Lori D. Huntington of Robinson, Seiler & Anderson, LC, were present for
the Plaintiff. Russell A. Cline of Crippen & Cline, LC, was present for the Defendant. The
Court having fully reviewed the pleadings submitted by the parties relative to the Plaintiffs
Motion for Summary Judgment, including the pleadings submitted to the Court by the Defendant,

and having heard counsel's oral arguments, and good cause appearing therefore, does, hereby,
Order, Adjudge and Decree as follows:
1. Plaintiffs Motion for Summary Judgment is granted in part and denied in part.
2. The Court finds that the Plaintiff has authority to act, in all ways, as the George
Osmond Estate's council, and can act pursuant to that certain Declaration of Protective
Covenants recorded with the Office of the Utah County Recorder, Utah County, State of Utah, as
Entry No. 12087 in Book 1546 commencing at page 760 including the amendments thereto.
3. The Court reserves for further determination any amounts which may be owed by the
Defendant to the Plaintiff.
DATED this

day of _

frW

, 2007.

BY THE COURT:

^i££k^
JUDGE ANf HO;
Fourth District C

Approved as to Form:

k'KST 0*r-^

CRIPPEN & CLINE, LC

JSSELL A. CLINE
Attorney for Defendant
ROBINSON, SEILER & ANDERSON, LC

THOMAS W. SEILER
Attorney for Plaintiff
-2-

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I hereby certify that on the \^Vh day of fTVfluu
2007, a true and correct copy of the
foregoing ORDER GRANTING PLAINTIFF'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT
was served by mailing via U.S. first class mail, postage prepaid, to the following:
Russell A. Cline
CRIPPEN & CLINE, LC
Attorneys for Defendant
10 West 100 South, Suite 425
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101

^mi^Lphc
N \Huntington\Osmond LaneAOrder Granting Plaintiffs MSj wpd
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Addendum G - Special Verdict, dated December 5,2008

IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
UTAH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

OSMOND LANE HOMEOWNERS
ASSOCIATION, an unincorporated
association,

SPECIAL VERDICT

Plaintiff,
vs.

Case No.: 060400414

GEORGE C. LANDRITH JR.

Judge Lynn Davis

Defendant.

1.

Do you find that every lot in the Osmond Lane Homeowners' Association was

jequired to be kept and maintained by the owner thereof in a clean, safe, attractive and sightly
condition, and in good repair?

Yes.
2.

A

No

Q

Do you find that George Landrith, Jr. breached the Declaration of Protective

Covenants?

Yes

f)

No

0

If your answer to question 1 or 2 above is yes, then please answer the next question.
If your answer is no, you may return this Special Verdict form to the bailiff.

3.

Do you find that the Osmond Lane Homeowners' Association was entitled to

provide exterior maintenance upon the George Landrith, Jr. lot as follows: paint, repair, replace
and care for roofs, gutters, down spouts, exterior building surfaces, trees, shrubs, grass walks,
and other exterior improvements.
Yes__£
4.

No

Q

Do you find that the Osmond Lane Homeowners' Association repaired the

damage caused by erosion (referred to throughout the trial as the hole) by contracting with
various entities to replace the railroad tie retaining wall with new retaining walls?
Yes
5.

jjj

No

O

What amount do you award the Osmond Lane Homeowners' Association

(the Plaintiff)?

$ .V>.l43.fr2
Please sign below and return this Special Verdict to the bailiff.
DATED this 5

day of December, 2008.

ML (fit,

Jury Foreperson
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Addendum H - Judgment (with Revised Calculation of
Interest), entered January 13,2009

Thomas W.Seiler, #2910
Aaron D. Lancaster, #11406
ROBINSON, SEILER & ANDERSON, LC
Attorneys for Plaintiff
2500 N. University Ave.
PO Box 1266
Provo, Utah 84603-1266
Telephone: (801) 375-1920
Facsimile: (801) 377-9405
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IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
UTAH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

OSMOND LANE HOMEOWNER'S
ASSOCIATION, an unincorporated
association,

JUDGMENT (WITH REVISED
CALCULATION OF INTEREST)

Plaintiff,
vs.

Civil No. 060400414
Judge Lynn W. Davis

GEORGE LANDRITH, JR.,
Defendant.

The above-entitled matter came on regularly for trial on December 4, and 5,2008 before the
above-entitled Court and a jury impaneled for the purpose of this trial.
Judgment shall enter in this matter in favor of the Plaintiff and against the Defendant as
follows:
a.

Damages as awarded in favor of the Plaintiff and against the Defendant by the

jury in the amount of $33,143.62.
1

J

yj

b.

Interest at the rate often percent (10%) per annum on the amounts found to be

owed by the Defendant to the Plaintiff from the date the debt was incurred in the
amount of ten percent (10%) per annum pursuant to Utah Code Annotated 15 -1 -1 (2)
in the amount of $10,627.75.
c. Attorneys' fees reasonable incurred in this matter in the amountof $59,831.90.
d. Costs in the amount of $1,815.02
For a judgment in total in the amount $105,418.29.
This Judgment shall be augmented by interest at the rate often percent (10%) per annum until
paid in full. It shall further be augmented by reasonable attorneys' fees and costs incurred in
collecting the same by execution or otherwise as may be established by affidavit.
In the absence of payment in full the Plaintiff is entitled to execute upon the real property
which is the subject matter of this dispute, Lot 144, Plat "B",

George Osmond Estates Subdivision.

The lien in this matter may be ordered foreclosed by a Sheriffs Sale of that property at the earliest
possible date.
DATED this jj>_ day o i j f e ^

, 200£_.

BYTHEC0U

2
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that on this Irf day of December, 2008,1 mailed, postage prepaid, a true and
correct copy of the foregoing JUDGMENT (WITH REVISED CALCULATION OF INTEREST)
to the following:
Russell A. Cline
CRIPPEN & CLINE
Attorneys for Defendant
10 West 100 South, Suite 425
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101

C/c<juJU?)fl.'3€teus--
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Addendum I - Photocopy of May 15, 2004 Journal Entry by
Nevan Anderson evidencing agreement between Anderson
and Landrith
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